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A GIANT LEAP FOR EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS? THE FINAL
AGREEMENT ONTHE EUROPEAN UNION’SACCESSIONTOTHE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PAUL GRAGL*
Abstract
After the EU’s accession to the ECHR has been discussed for more than
thirty years, an Accession Agreement has been finalized in 2013. By
subjecting EU law to the supervision of the ECtHR and by enabling
individuals to submit complaints against the EU institutions to
Strasbourg, one of the last gaps in European human rights protection will
be overcome. But accession may not take place as swiftly as some may
hope for, as many legal problems remain unsolved. This article examines
the most urgent legal issues in the context of accession, such as its scope
and legal effects; its procedural aspects (the co-respondent mechanism,
inter-Party cases, and the prior involvement procedure) and their relation
to the Union’s legal autonomy; and the institutional interlacing of the EU
and the Council of Europe and the former’s future involvement in the
Parliamentary Assembly and in the Committee of Ministers.
1. Introduction
With regard to the European Union’s future accession to the European
Convention on Human Rights, one could paraphrase the words of the first
man on the moon, and say that what appears like a small step from the outside,
may be a giant leap for Europe. In a historically unprecedented move, a
non-State entity (or, to use an alternative notion to capture the EU’s uncertain
legal status: an international organization sui generis1) will accede to a human
rights treaty and subject itself to this treaty’s judicial supervision regime. One
* Lecturer in Law at Queen Mary, University of London. E-mail: p.gragl@qmul.ac.uk. The
author wishes to thank his doctoral supervisors Wolfgang Benedek (University of Graz) and
Kirsten Schmalenbach (University of Salzburg) for their support on this topic, and Renate
Kicker (University of Graz) for the initial idea to write a thesis about EU accession to the
ECHR.
1. Von Bodgandy, “Grundprinzipien” in Von Bogdandy and Bast (eds.), Europäisches
Verfassungsrecht: Theoretische und dogmatische Grundzüge, 2nd ed. (Springer, 2009), pp. 15
and 32.
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of the most intriguing aspects of accession is, however, that the EU Member
States are already Contracting Parties to the Convention.2 In this vein,
accession intends to end this anomaly and enhance the EU’s credibility as a
human rights actor within the “greater Europe” of the Council of Europe.3
After more than thirty years of discussion,4 EU-internal setbacks like Opinion
2/94 finding a lack of EU competence to accede to the Convention,5 and the
eventual entry into force of both Protocol No. 146 and the Treaty of Lisbon,7
the last years have seen the successful completion of negotiations on the final
Agreement on EU Accession to the Convention (hereinafter: AA)8 and its
Explanatory Report9 in April 2013. Heralded as the “End of an Epic”,10 this
new legal status quo will most certainly “deprive academics and lawyers of
one of their favourite topics”.11 The Accession Agreement aims at lifting the
“organizational veil” of the EU behind which the Member States have
successfully hidden,12 as the Bosphorus judgment of the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) descriptively demonstrated. Until the EU has
acceded to the Convention, the EU Member States (when implementing
Union law) will not be held responsible for alleged violations of the
Convention as long as the Union protects fundamental rights in a manner
equivalent to that provided by the Convention.13
The Accession Agreement constitutes the last step of a growing interlocked
system of fundamental rights, and intends to enhance the effective
2. Obwexer, “Der Beitritt der EU zur EMRK: Rechtsgrundlagen, Rechtsfragen und
Rechtsfolgen”, 47 EuR (2012), 115–148, 115.
3. Ladenburger, “The protection of fundamental rights post-Lisbon: The interaction
between the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) and National Constitutions”, Institutional Report, XXV FIDE Congress, 30 May – 2
June 2012, p. 44.
4. Commission of the European Communities, memorandum on the accession of the
European Communities to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Bulletin Supplement 2/79, COM(79)210 final.
5. Opinion 2/94, Accession to the ECHR [1996] ECR I-1759.
6. Cf. especially Art. 17 of Protocol No. 14, amending Art. 59 ECHR, thus allowing for
accession.
7. Cf. especially Art. 6(2) TEU, both enabling and obliging the EU to accede to the
Convention.
8. 47+1(2013)008rev2, Final Report to the CDDH, 10 June 2013.
9. Explanatory Report, 47+1(2013)008rev2.
10. Lock, “End of an epic? The draft agreement on the EU’s accession to the ECHR”, 31
YEL (2012), 162–197.
11. Jacqué, “The accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”, 48 CML Rev. (2011), 995–1023, 995.
12. Stubberfield, “Lifting the organisational veil: Positive obligations of the European
Union following accession to the European Convention on Human Rights”, 19 Australian
International Law Journal (2012), 117.
13. ECtHR,Bosphorus v. Ireland,Appl. No. 45036/98, judgment of 30 June 2005, para 155.
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enforcement of fundamental rights within this system.14 By and large,
accession will entitle any person, non-governmental organization or group of
individuals to submit the acts, measures and omissions of the European
Union, like those of every other High Contracting Party, to the external control
of the ECtHR in the light of the rights enshrined in the Convention – which is
even more important due to the transfer of substantial powers from the
Member States to the EU. Furthermore, it will also enable the ECJ to apply the
Convention directly, without taking recourse to the general principles under
Article 6(3) TEU. This will allow the EU to play a full role in proceedings in
Strasbourg in cases involving EU law and cement more firmly the role and
decisions of the ECtHR in the Union legal order.15 Concurrently, the
negotiators of the Accession Agreement tried to take into account that the
autonomy of EU law should not be prejudiced by the Agreement itself and
the subsequent case law of the Strasbourg Court, especially since the Court of
Justice of the EU as well as the courts of the EU Member States are also
obliged to ensure the observance and protection of human rights within the
Union legal system (under the principle of subsidiarity in Art. 35(1) ECHR).16
In twelve clearly arranged articles, the Accession Agreement contains two
categories of provisions. The first category comprises modifications to the
Convention itself, which will be rendered obsolete after the entry into force of
the Accession Agreement and the eventual modification of the Convention.17
These modifications are, however, kept to a necessary minimum, as the
current control mechanism of the Convention should, as far as possible, be
preserved and applied to the Union in the same way as to the other High
Contracting Parties.18 The second category of provisions governs the status of
the EU as a High Contracting Party to the Convention, and will remain valid
alongside the Convention after accession in a manner comparable to that of a
substantive additional Protocol.19 Even though the Union should accede to the
ECHR on an equal footing with the other High Contracting Parties, the
Accession Agreement correctly acknowledges that the EU is not a sovereign
nation-State and that therefore, certain adaptations (among them, most
importantly, the co-respondent mechanism and the prior involvement of the
14. Grewe, “Beitritt der EU zur EMRK und ZP 14: Wirksame Durchsetzung einer
gesamteuropäischen Grundrechteverfassung?”, 47 EuR (2012), 285–308, 288.
15. Besselink, “The protection of fundamental rights post-Lisbon: The interaction between
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
and National Constitutions”, General Report, XXV FIDE Congress, 30 May – 2 June 2012,
p. 35.
16. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, paras. 5–6.
17. Obwexer, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 125.
18. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 7.
19. Obwexer, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 125.
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ECJ) are necessary in order to allow the future functioning of the ECHR
system.20
Despite the enormous efforts of the Accession Agreement, accession itself
may not take place as swiftly as some may hope for,21 as many legal problems
still need to be solved. The Agreement could, for instance, in no way foretell
and take into consideration all the legal consequences of accession or how the
cooperative relationship between the ECJ and the ECtHR might change.22
And although this contribution assumes that the Accession Agreement is
compatible with the EU Treaties, and that the negotiators tried as best as
possible to make allowances for the autonomy of the EU legal order, there is no
telling whether the Accession Agreement does in fact live up to these high
expectations. In July 2013, the ECJ has been requested by the European
Commission under Article 218(11) TFEU to give an opinion on the question
whether the Accession Agreement is in fact compatible with the Treaties.23 At
the time of writing, Opinion 2/13 was still in progress and therefore not
available for further analysis or speculation with regard to its result.
This article can only cover a selection of the most pressing legal issues
involved, since a complete analysis would render it far too long. Section 2
therefore examines the scope and legal effects of accession, both for the EU
and the Convention system (Arts. 1, 2, 10, and 11 AA), whilst section 3 deals
with the procedural aspects of accession (the co-respondent mechanism,
inter-Party cases, and the prior involvement procedure) and their relation to
the Union’s legal autonomy (Arts. 3 to 5 AA). Section 4 highlights the
institutional interlacing of the EU and the Council of Europe and the EU’s
future involvement in the latter’s bodies, e.g. the Parliamentary Assembly (for
the election of ECtHR judges; Art. 6 AA) and the Committee of Ministers (in
order to participate in the supervision of enforcement of ECtHR judgments;
Art. 7 AA). The EU’s future participation in the expenditure related to the
Convention (Art. 8 AA) and the EU’s relations with other agreements (Art. 9
AA) do not raise substantial legal issues in this respect and will therefore be
disregarded here. Similarly, Article 12 AA merely contains a typical final
clause included in treaties prepared under the auspices of the Council of
Europe and consequently does not require any assessment.
20. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 7.
21. Lock, op. cit. supra note 10, p. 163.
22. Eckes, “EU Accession to the ECHR: Between autonomy and adaptation”, 76 MLR
(2013), 254–285, 255.
23. Opinion 2/13, Agreement on EU accession to the ECHR, request for an Opinion by the
European Commission, 4 July 2013, O.J. C 260/32, 7 Sept. 2013.
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2. Scope and legal effects of accession
2.1. Scope of accession
Article 1 AA straightforwardly states that the EU accedes to the Convention
and will become a Party to it upon entry into force of the Accession
Agreement (Art. 10(4) AA), which means that there is no further requirement
to deposit a separate instrument of accession.24 Moreover, the Union will
concurrently accede to the Protocol to the Convention25 and to Protocol No.
6.26 This approach of the “least common denominator”27 has been chosen so
as to maintain the principle of neutrality with regard to the Member States,
thus avoiding any risk of challenging any Member State action within the
scope of EU law in relation to a Protocol which the Member State in question
has not ratified. The negotiators consequently opted to limit EU accession to
those Protocols to which all the Member States are already parties (i.e.
Protocols No. 1 and No. 6).28 Should the Union wish to accede to the other
Protocols containing substantive rights (i.e. Protocols No. 4,29 7,30 12,31 and
1332), which have not been ratified by all Member States, it will need to
deposit separate accession instruments33 and comply with the procedure set
forth in Article 218 TFEU. To this end, it will not be necessary to conclude
another Accession Agreement, since the existing Accession Agreement
already covers accession to the other Protocols in substantive terms34 in
24. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 17.
25. Commonly referred to as Protocol No. 1 (ETS No. 9) safeguarding certain rights as
diverse as the right to property, the right to education, and the right to free elections.
26. Protocol No. 6 (ETS No. 114) concerning the abolition of the death penalty in times of
peace.
27. Gragl, The accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human
Rights (Hart, 2013), p. 94.
28. Jacqué, op. cit. supra note 11, 1004.
29. Protocol No. 4, guaranteeing the freedom of movement, prohibition of collective
expulsion of aliens and the prohibition of imprisonment for debt, has not been ratified by
Greece and the United Kingdom.
30. Protocol No. 7 containing the procedural safeguards for expulsion of aliens, the right of
appeal to a higher court, compensation for wrongful conviction, the principle of double
jeopardy or ne bis in idem and the equality between spouses, has not been ratified by Germany,
the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
31. Protocol No. 12 safeguarding the general prohibition of discrimination, was only
ratified by Croatia, Cyprus, Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovenia, and
Spain.
32. Protocol No. 13 enshrining the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances, was
not ratified by Poland.
33. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 17.
34. Obwexer, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 142.
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Article 1(2)(a) AA, providing that accession to the other Protocols shall be
governed,mutatis mutandis, by the respective provisions of these Protocols.35
There are, however, two scenarios with respect to the additional Protocols
which could raise significant legal issues. The first scenario relates to cases
where individuals rely on certain rights enshrined in the Charter,36 which are
tantamount to rights set forth in a Protocol other than Protocol No. 1 or No. 6
(i.e. a Protocol that has not been ratified by all Member States). A delicate
issue can be found, for instance, in Article 4 of Protocol 4 to the ECHR, the
prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens, which corresponds to Article
19(1) of the Charter.37 The ECJ could either strictly adhere to the wording of
the Accession Agreement and only apply the provisions of those Protocols to
which the Union has actually acceded, or it may engage in judicial activism38
and conclude that the other Protocols are also covered by the corresponding
Charter provisions39 – a course of action which is also supported by the
Charter Explanations expressly stating that “[t]he reference to the ECHR
covers both the Convention and the Protocols to it”.40 Advocate General Cruz
Villalón has nevertheless called for a partially autonomous interpretation of
those Charter rights corresponding to rights set forth in Protocols which have
not been ratified by all Member States (e.g. the principle of ne bis in idem;Art.
50 of the Charter and Art. 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention).41
With respect to the second scenario, it remains uncertain how the ECtHR
will decide when requested to adjudicate upon an application against an EU
Member State for violating – whilst implementing Union law – a right set forth
in a Protocol to which the Union has not acceded, but which the Member State
in question has in fact ratified. It was suggested that in such a case the
Strasbourg Court could reactivate its Bosphorus formula42 and assess whether
the protection offered by the EU was manifestly deficient or not.43 Having
said that, however, Strasbourg is probably best advised to eventually abandon
35. These are: Art. 7 of Protocol No. 4, Arts. 8–10 of Protocol No. 7, Arts. 4–6 of Protocol
No. 12, and Arts. 6–8 of Protocol No. 13. Cf. also Explanatory Report, 47+1(2013)008rev2,
cited supra note 9, para 20.
36. Art. 52(3) of the Charter refers back to the Convention for cases where the Charter
“contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention.”
37. Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, O.J. C 303/02, 14
December 2007, p. 24.
38. Gragl, op. cit. supra note 27, p. 95.
39. Jacqué, op. cit. supra note 11, 1004.
40. Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, cited supra note 37, p. 33.
41. Case C-617/10, Åklagaren v. Hans Åkerberg Fransson, judgment of 26 Feb. 2013, nyr,
Opinion of A.G. Cruz Villalón, paras. 70–96.
42. ECtHR, Bosphorus, cited supra note 13, para 155.
43. Jacqué, op. cit. supra note 11, 1005.
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the Bosphorus doctrine, as shielding the EU from its scrutiny undermines the
very objective of the Union’s accession to the Convention.44
2.2. Legal effects of accession
2.2.1. For the European Union
– Judgments by the European Court of Human Rights
The most obvious legal effect of EU accession to the Convention will be that
the decisions of the ECtHR in cases to which the EU is party will be binding
on all EU institutions (including the ECJ45).46 Article 46 ECHR evidently
provides that the High Contracting Parties must abide by the final judgment of
the ECtHR in all cases to which they are parties, which also applies to the
European Union and all of its executive, legislative, and judicial organs after
accession.47
Yet, there are two legal issues in relation to ECtHR judgments on alleged
violations of the Convention by the EU. Firstly, fears have been voiced that the
Strasbourg Court might undertake a binding interpretation of Union law and
thus encroach upon the EU’s legal autonomy within the meaning of Opinion
1/91,48 particularly in cases where the ECtHR must closely scrutinize
domestic law (e.g. in cases involving the interpretation of Arts. 5, 8–10, and
13 ECHR, which expressly mention domestic law as a standard of
lawfulness).49 However, this would only jeopardize the autonomy of EU law if
the ECtHR determined the content of Union law in an internally binding
fashion50 – which is never the case, as “it is primarily for the national
authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law….”51
Beyond that, the ECJ would always have the first chance to decide on the
interpretation of Union law before the ECtHR might do so: either due to the
rule that internal remedies be exhausted before calling upon the Strasbourg
Court (Art. 35 ECHR),52 or – in case a Member State court neglects to request
44. Besselink, op. cit. supra note 15, p. 37.
45. Cf. Opinion 1/91, European EconomicArea I (EEA I) [1991] ECR I-6079, para 39, and
Opinion 1/92, European Economic Area II (EEA II) [1992] ECR I-2821, para 33.
46. Explanatory Report, 47+1(2013)008rev2, cited supra note 9, para 26.
47. Meyer-Ladewig, EMRK-Handkommentar, 3rd ed (Nomos, 2011), Art. 46, para 22.
48. Opinion 1/91, cited supra note 45, para 39.
49. De Schutter, “L’adhésion de l’Union européenne à la Convention européenne des droits
de l’homme: Feuille de route de la negotiation”, 83 Revue Trimestrielle des droits de l’homme
(2010), 535–571, 551–552.
50. Lock, “Walking on a Tightrope: The draft ECHR accession agreement and the
autonomy of the EU legal order”, 48 CML Rev. (2011), 1025–1054, 1034–1035.
51. ECtHR, Huvig v. France, Appl. No. 11105/84, judgment of 24 April 1990, para 28.
52. ECommHR, Dufay v. The European Communities, alternatively: Their Member States
a) jointly and b) severally, App. No. 13539/88, decision of 19 Jan. 1989.
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a preliminary ruling and the applicant then submits its complaint directly to
the ECtHR – on basis of the prior involvement of the ECJ under Article 3(6)
AA.53 Since the ECtHR would never perform an original interpretation of
Union law, it would not determine its interpretation in an internally binding
manner and thence not endanger the Union’s legal autonomy.54
Secondly, following the respective ECJ case law on the direct applicability
of decisions of international treaty bodies,55 the question has been raised
whether ECtHR decisions might also be directly applicable within the Union
legal order56 and would thus possibly invalidate secondary EU law in
contravention to the Convention. Given the ECJ’s exclusive jurisdiction in
declaring Union acts invalid,57 any decision by the Strasbourg Court on the
validity of Union law would clearly encroach upon the EU’s legal autonomy.
However, Strasbourg’s judgments are declaratory in nature and concern
individual cases; even if they were directly applicable within the domestic
legal orders of the High Contracting Parties (as interpretations of the
Convention), they would not be capable of invalidating municipal legal acts.58
The power of the Convention system lies in the wording of Article 46 ECHR
and its binding force on the High Contracting Parties, which are obligated to
comply with Strasbourg’s decisions. This power, however, does not stem from
any invalidating effect, but from the High Contracting Parties’ lawful
compliance with their obligations under the Convention.
– The legal status of the ECHR and the Accession Agreement after
accession
The Accession Agreement will be concluded as a treaty between the
forty-seven High Contracting Parties to the Convention (including the 28 EU
Member States) on the one hand and the European Union on the other.59 Since
public international law leaves the arrangement of relationships between
international law and domestic law via renvoi to the latter,60 and the Accession
Agreement is entirely silent on this matter, it is not instantly evident what legal
status the Convention and the Agreement itself will have within the EU’s
normative hierarchy after accession.
53. The prior involvement procedure is discussed in detail in section 3.3. infra.
54. Lock, op. cit. supra note 50, 1036.
55. Case C-192/89, Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1990] ECR I-3461, para 15.
56. Obwexer, op. cit. supra note 2, 146.
57. Case 314/85, Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199, para 15.
58. Lock, op. cit. supra note 50, 1036.
59. Obwexer, op. cit. supra note 2, 125.
60. Wildhaber and Breitenmoser, “The relationship between customary international law
and municipal law in western European countries”, 48 ZaöRV (1988), 163–207, 164.
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According to the ECJ’s settled case law, international agreements form – in
a quasi-monist fashion61 – an integral part of EU law62 and rank on a
“mezzanine”63 level between primary and secondary EU law,64 thus binding
the EU and its institutions both externally under public international law65 and
internally pursuant to Article 216(2) TFEU. Thereby, both the Convention and
the Accession Agreement will – as an integral part of EU law – also enjoy the
same supremacy over the Member States’ legal orders as “genuinely” created
Union law.66 This means that national courts are required to disapply domestic
law in the event of conflict with Convention rights in their manifestation as
Union law. Moreover, since the Convention contains “clear and precise
obligation[s], which [are] not subject, in [their] implementation or effects, to
the adoption of any subsequent measure”,67 and clearly understandable rights
for individuals, the Convention will arguably be directly applicable and have
self-executing effects for both individuals and government authorities. Lastly,
as international treaties in the form of “Unionized” international law are part
of “the law”68 as set forth in Article 19(1) TEU, the Convention and the
Accession Agreement will, after accession, also be encompassed in the
jurisdiction of the ECJ. As a result, it will primarily be the duty of
the Luxembourg Court to interpret and apply the Convention as part of EU law
and to ensure, under the principle of subsidiarity, an effective protection of
human rights within the Union legal order before any cases can be submitted
to the ECtHR.69
61. Kuijper and Bronckers, “WTO Law in the European Court of Justice”, 42 CML Rev.
(2005), 1313–1355, 1314; cf. however, Peters, “The position of international law within the
European Community legal order”, 40 German Yearbook of International Law (1997), 9–77,
28–29, and Tietje, “The status of international law in the European Legal order: The case of
international treaties and non-binding international instruments”, in Wouters, Nollkaemper,
and de Wet (Eds.), The Europeanisation of International Law (TMC Asser Press, 2008), p. 58,
arguing that EU law does not truly follow a dualist model, but not a monist one either.
62. Case 181/73, Haegeman v. Belgian State [1974] ECR 449, para 5.
63. Kumin, “Die Verhandlungsvorbereitungen für den Beitritt der Europäischen Union zur
Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention – Ein Erfahrungsbericht”, in Stadlmeier (Ed.), Von
Lissabon zum Raumfahrzeug: Aktuelle Herausforderungen im Völkerrecht – Beiträge zum 35.
Österreichischen Völkerrechtstag (Neuer Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 2011), pp. 65–86, 73.
64. Case C-61/94, Commission v. Germany (International Dairy Agreement) [1996] ECR
I-3989, para 52.
65. Case 104/81, Kupferberg & Cie. KG (Kupferberg I) [1982] ECR 3641, para 14.
66. Thym, “Auswärtige Gewalt” in Von Bogdandy and Bast (Eds.), Europäisches
Verfassungsrecht: Theoretische und dogmatische Grundzüge, 2nd ed. (Springer, 2009), p. 457.
67. Case 12/86, Demirel [1987] ECR 3719, para 14.
68. Case C-280/93,Germany v.Council (Bananas – CommonOrganization of theMarkets)
[1994] ECR I-4973, para 144; Case C-149/96, Portugal v. Council (Market Access in Textile
Products) [1999] ECR I-8395, paras. 47–51.
69. Gragl, op. cit. supra note 27, pp. 98–99.
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The choice to incorporate the Convention into the EU legal order as an
international treaty between primary and secondary might entail certain risks.
It has been criticized that this specific legal status could result in legal
problems between the EU’s “own” fundamental rights on the level of primary
law (i.e. the Charter by virtue of Art. 6(1) TEU, and the general principles of
law under Art. 6(3) TEU) and the Convention rights on the mezzanine level,
inferior to primary law. In particular, the constitutional significance of
accession for the Union, as emphasized by the ECJ itself in its Opinion 2/94,70
supports the view that a “constitutional” rank for the Convention would have
been more appropriate71 than simply labelling the Convention as a mere
international agreement.72
Having said that, however, one must bear in mind that the Convention need
not rank at a primary law level in order to guarantee an effective protection of
human rights. Apart from Austria (where the Convention forms part of the
Constitution73), and the Netherlands (where it even ranks superior to the
Constitution74), the Convention is usually on a par with ordinary,
non-constitutional, statutory law.75 Therefore it does not seem necessary for
the Convention to be of constitutional status within the Union legal order.
Moreover, the Convention merely constitutes the bottom threshold of human
rights protection for its High Contracting Parties, including the EU, and leaves
it to them to provide an even more extensive standard of protection – as laid
down in the second sentence of Article 52(3) of the EU Charter.76 In fact, if the
Convention ranked on the same hierarchical level as the Charter, this could
result in judicial divergences in the ECJ’s case law, normative conflicts, and
legal uncertainty, since the EU would be simultaneously bound by a higher
70. Opinion 2/94, cited supra note 5, para 35.
71. Grewe, op. cit. supra note 14, 296.
72. Weiß, “Human rights in the EU: Rethinking the role of the European Convention on
Human Rights after lisbon”, 7 ECLR (2011), 64–95, 72, and Naumann, “Art. 52 Abs. 3 GrCH
zwischen Kohärenz des europäischen Grundrechtsschutzes und Autonomie des Unionsrechts”,
43 EuR (2008), 424–435.
73. Grabenwarter, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, 4th ed. (C.H. Beck, 2009), § 3,
para 2; the Convention was retroactively granted constitutional status in 1964 via federal
statute, cf. BGBl. 1964/59.
74. Van Dijk, “Domestic status of human rights treaties and the attitude of the judiciary –
the Dutch case” in Nowak, Steurer and Tretter (Eds.), Festschrift für Felix Ermacora:
Fortschritt im Bewusstsein der Grund- und Menschenrechte (N.P. Engel, 1988), pp. 638–639.
75. Cf. e.g. Keller and Stone Sweet (Eds.), A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on
National Legal Systems (OUP, 2008); and Blackburn and Polakiewicz (Eds.), Fundamental
Rights in Europe (OUP, 2001).
76. Borowsky, “Art. 52”, in Meyer (Ed.), Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union
(Nomos, 2010), para 30b.
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and a lower standard of fundamental rights protection, not knowing which one
to apply in a given case.77
– The principle of neutrality and the EU-internal division of
competences
The second sentence of Article 6(2)TEU andArticle 2 of Protocol No. 8 to the
Treaties require that accession should not affect the Union’s competences or
the powers of its institutions, as defined in the Treaties,78 especially with
regard to the Member States. Article 1(3) AA takes due account of this
principle of neutrality vis-à-vis the division of competences between the
Union and its Member States, providing that accession “shall impose on the
European Union obligations with regard only to acts, measures or omissions
on its institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, or of persons acting on their
behalf. Nothing in the Convention or the Protocols thereto shall require the
[EU] to perform an act or adopt a measure for which it has no competence
under [EU] law.”
This clause is, nonetheless, merely a symbolic promise to soothe Member
States’ concerns of losing sovereignty and competences to the Union.
National governments are worried that, after accession, the ECJ might expand
its competences in the field of fundamental rights at the expense of the
Member States.79 The Member States, however, ignore the fact that an
agreement under international law imposes certain duties upon the
Contracting Parties, but it does not govern the internal rules of allocating
competences between them and the organization in question. In addition, if
legal acts by the Union are reviewed with respect to their accordance with
fundamental rights under the first half of the first sentence of Article 51(1) of
the Charter, the internal division of competences between the Union and the
Member States is not affected at all. In this context, conflicts may arise in
situations where the Member States are bound by the Union’s fundamental
rights, according to the second half of the first sentence of Article 51(1) of the
Charter; in other words when they are implementing Union law. In Åkerberg
Fransson,80 however, the ECJ decided that the Member States are bound by
the Charter and EU fundamental rights whenever their legislation falls within
the scope of EU law. As this concept is still not clearly defined, the
Luxembourg Court has practically undermined the safety valve of Article
51(1) of the Charter, which the Member States had deliberately inserted into
77. Gragl, op. cit. supra note 27, p. 100.
78. Cf. also Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 22.
79. Winkler, Der Beitritt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften zur Europäischen
Menschenrechtskonvention (Nomos, 2000), pp. 116–117.
80. Åkerberg Fransson, cited supra note 41, paras. 16–31.
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the Charter in order to limit the competences of the ECJ.81 Yet, according to
Article 51(2) of the Charter, no new obligations will be created for the
Member States, nor will the Charter relocate any powers at their expense,82 as
the Member States are already legally bound by the Convention and their
international obligations before accession when implementing Union law83 –
especially since the ECJ ruled inMcB that “it follows from Article 52(3) of the
Charter that, in so far as the Charter contains rights which correspond to rights
guaranteed by the ECHR, their meaning and scope are to be the same as those
laid down by the ECHR”.84 This means, in a nutshell, that the ECJ should
follow Strasbourg’s case law even before accession85 and that, in this regard,
there will not be any profound changes for the Member States.
– The need for further EU-internal rules
Accession will mostly be governed by the Accession Agreement, and not by
amendments to the Convention.86 Since the Agreement will continue to have
legal effects even after accession, the EU is required to adopt specific internal
legal rules to govern various matters with respect to accession, in particular in
relation to the co-respondent mechanism and the prior involvement of the
ECJ.87 The requirement to adopt further internal rules will not endanger the
legal autonomy of the EU legal order, since the actual procedure of adopting
and implementing these rules lies within the discretion of the Union in order
to maintain its distinctive legal features.88
2.2.2. For the ECHR system
– Amendments to Article 59 ECHR
One significant change entailed by EU accession to the Convention is the
necessity of modifications to the text of the Convention itself. From a rather
“technical” viewpoint, it is interesting to note that Article 1(2) AA modifies
Article 59(2) ECHR in order to allow for EU accession, whilst the EU joins the
circle of High Contracting Parties to the Convention at the very moment the
81. Lavranos, “The ECJ’s Judgments in Melloni and Åkerberg Fransson: Une ménage
à trois difficulté”, 3 European Law Reporter (2013), 133–141, 139.
82. But cf. the ambiguous reference to Art. 51(2) of the Charter in Case C-400/10 PPU, J.
McB. v. L.E. [2010] ECR I-8965, paras. 51 and 59.
83. Obwexer, op. cit. supra note 2, 126.
84. J. McB. cited supra note 82, para 53.
85. Eckes, op. cit. supra note 22, p. 278.
86. Cf. Art. 1(2) AA.
87. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 21.
88. Gragl, op. cit. supra note 27, p. 96.
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Accession Agreement enters into force.89 Firstly, a new Article 59(2)(a)
ECHR will permit the EU to accede to the Protocols of the Convention by
stating that the provisions of the Protocols concerning signature and
ratification, entry into force and depositary functions90 shall apply, mutatis
mutandis, in the event of the EU’s accession to those Protocols.91 More
importantly, however, Article 1(2) AA also introduces a new Article 59(2)(b)
ECHR, which provides that the Accession Agreement constitutes an integral
part of the Convention. This means in concreto that both the Convention and
the Accession Agreement will form a treaty “package” which makes it
possible to limit the amendments made to the Convention itself (e.g.,
interpretation clauses are covered by the relevant provisions of the Agreement
and will not be incorporated into the Convention). Given this treaty “package”
of Convention and Accession Agreement, it will not be possible for any High
Contracting Party to denounce the Agreement separately from the
Convention; vice versa, denunciation of the Convention is tantamount to a
denunciation of the Accession Agreement.
Lastly, due to the continuing legal effect of the Agreement after the EU’s
future accession to the Convention, its provisions will be subject to
interpretation by the ECtHR, whose rules of procedure also require according
adaptation.92
The requirement for prior amendment to the Convention in order to allow
for the accession of a new High Contracting Party is very unusual and in fact
unprecedented in the context of the Convention as, to date, amendments to the
text of the Convention and accessions have always taken place separately in
time. Therefore it has been remarked that the Accession Agreement bears
more technical legal similarities with the accession agreements of States to the
EU than previous amending Protocols to the Convention.93
– Rules on attributability for the ECtHR
Given the strict preconditions enshrined in Article 6(2) TEU and Article 2 of
Protocol No. 8 to the Treaties that accession must not affect the division of
competences between the EU and the Member States, the ECtHR must not
determine this division by adjudicating upon the question of which entity
89. Králová, “Comments on the draft agreement on the accession of the European Union to
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”, 2 Czech
Yearbook of Public & Private International Law (2012), 127–142, 131.
90. See supra note 35, and Art. 6 of the Protocol and Arts. 7–9 of Protocol No. 6.
91. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 20. Cf. the analyses below on the
co-respondent mechanism and the prior involvement procedure for further details.
92. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 21.
93. Eckes, op. cit. supra note 22, 265.
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(either the EU or the Member State) was in fact responsible for an alleged
violation of the Convention. Only the ECJ is given jurisdiction to assess
questions of competence.94
Yet, as the correct attribution of conduct or omission to a High Contracting
Party by the ECtHR is a prerequisite for ascertaining a violation of the
Convention,95 Article 1(4) AA further defines the attributability of acts,
measures or omissions of the Member States allegedly in violation of the
Convention, and thus, for the sake of consistency, lays down rules parallel to
those of EU law.96 This provision provides that, when implementing EU law,
including decisions taken under primary law, such acts, measures or omissions
of organs of an EU Member State or of persons acting on its behalf “shall be
attributed to that [Member] State.” Principally if persons employed or
appointed by a Member State take action within the framework of an operation
pursuant to a decision of an EU institution, their acts, measures and omissions
will be attributed to the Member State in question.97 Such attribution will of
course not preclude the EU from joining the procedures before the ECtHR and
from being responsible as a co-respondent for a violation. This model of
attribution clearly reflects the ECtHR’s line of reasoning in the Matthews
case, in which Strasbourg held that the Convention does not bar the
Contracting Parties from transferring competences to international
organizations (such as the EU) by concluding international agreements (such
as the Union Treaties), provided that the Convention rights continue to be
“secured”. In this case, the Member States’ responsibility continues, even
after such a transfer of powers,98 which means that they cannot escape their
responsibilities under the Convention by outsourcing competences to the
European Union.
Acts, measures and omissions of the Union institutions, bodies, offices or
agencies, or of persons acting on their behalf, conversely, will be attributed –
analogously to the rules of EU law under Article 340(2) TFEU99 – to the EU
itself. This applies to acts, measures or omissions, regardless of the context in
which they occur, also including matters relating to the EU Common Foreign
94. Lock, op. cit. supra note 50, 1042.
95. Eckes, op. cit. supra note 22, 265–266.
96. Cf. especially Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90, Francovich and Bonifaci v. Italy [1991] ECR
I-5357, paras. 31 et seq.; Joined Cases C-46 & 48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame
[1996] ECR I-1029, para 17; Case C-224/01, Köbler v. Austria [2003] ECR I-10239, paras.
30–40.
97. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 23.
98. ECtHR,Matthews v. United Kingdom,Appl. No. 24833/94, judgment of 18 Feb. 1999,
para 32.
99. Cf. e.g. Case C-370/89, SGEEM and Etroy v. EIB [1992] ECR I-6211, para 15; Joined
Cases 7/56, 3–7/57, Algera, [1957] ECR 39, pp. 66–67; Case T-547/93, Lopes v. Court of
Justice [Staff Cases 1996] I-A-63, II-185.
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and Security Policy (CFSP).100 This system of attribution is modelled after
Strasbourg’s Bosphorus101 judgment in which the ECtHR clarified that the
EU Member States cannot be held responsible for alleged violations of the
Convention, if (1) such acts are based on EU law, i.e. the State is implementing
Union legislation; (2) the State does not enjoy any discretion in doing so; and
(3) as long as the EU can be regarded to protect fundamental rights in a manner
which can be considered at least equivalent to that provided by the Convention
if Member State action is taken in compliance with obligations under EU
law.102 In other words, whereas the Member States remain responsible for acts
and decisions taken under primary law, which are international treaties freely
concluded and entered into by them, the EU will principally be responsible for
violations of the Convention by its own legislation, i.e. secondary law. Only if
secondary EU law leaves the Member States a certain margin of discretion
with regard to its implementation can the Member States be held responsible
for contravening the Convention.103Vice versa, in any of these cases, neither
the EU nor the Member States are precluded from joining the proceedings as
co-respondents.104
The additional benefit of these new rules of attributing responsibility to
either a Member State or the Union lies in the fact that, so far, the ECtHR has
not given a specific rule on attribution of such acts or measures to either the
international organization concerned or the Contracting Party in question in
any of the cases in which it decided on the attribution of acts or measures by
Contracting Parties operating in the framework of an international
organization (especially the United Nations).105 In Behrami and Saramati, for
example, the ECtHR had to decide whether certain alleged human rights
violations in Kosovo were in fact attributable to France and Norway, the two
States acting under the auspices of the UN in this case. The ECtHR eventually
held that the acts in question had been committed by the States in their
functions under the United Nations InterimAdministration Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK) and the UN-authorized security presence in Kosovo (KFOR).
Consequently, as France and Norway had been under the ultimate authority
and control of the UN, these acts were attributable to the UN and not to the
individual States involved in the actual operations.106 Having noted that the
100. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 23.
101. ECtHR, Bosphorus, cited supra note 13.
102. Ibid., para 155.
103. ECtHR,MSS v. Belgium and Greece, Appl. No. 30696/09, judgment of 21 Jan. 2011,
para 338.
104. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 23.
105. Ibid., para 24.
106. ECtHR, Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and
Norway, Appl. No. 714120/01, judgment of 2 May 2007, para 134.
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UN was not a Contracting Party to the Convention, Strasbourg declined
jurisdiction in the case107 and, surprisingly, did not have recourse to its own
judgment in Bosphorus in order to exercise jurisdiction over acts of States
carried out on behalf of the UN, if the standard of human rights protection fell
below the threshold of the Convention.108 In Al-Jedda, however, the ECtHR
held – despite the similarities of this case to Behrami and Saramati – that the
United Kingdom was responsible for the unlawful internment of a man by its
troops deployed as part of the UN-authorized Multinational Force in Iraq,
since the invasion of Iraq had not been a United Nations mission in the first
place and the UN had no ultimate authority and control in this case.109
With regard to the attribution of responsibility to either the EU or a Member
State, the Accession Agreement provides a clear and transparent rule of
attributability. If a case comparable to Behrami and Saramati arises after
accession, the EU would undoubtedly be responsible for any violation of the
Convention if their agents act on behalf of the Union and are under its
control;110 whereas in a case similar to Al-Jedda,111 one may assume that one
or more Member States alone would be held responsible for any breaches of
the Convention.
– Extent of Control Exercised by the ECtHR
The main reason for accession is so that individual applicants have the right to
submit complaints against the EU regarding alleged violations of the
Convention to the ECtHR. Such violations can be rooted in any executive
actions or omissions of the EU organs, the decisions of the EU courts, in
secondary law, or primary law.112 Since secondary law is tantamount to Union
legislation, initiated by the Commission and enacted by the Council and the
Parliament, it can ultimately be annulled by the ECJ if the ECtHR finds it to
violate the Convention.113 In contrast to that, the potential modification of
primary law in violation of the Convention is a very different cup of tea.
Primary law is based on international treaties, concluded by and entered into
by the Member States, and can only be modified by the Member States under
Article 48 TEU. Moreover, due to the absence of explicit provisions allowing
the ECJ to invalidate provisions of primary law, that Court is in fact powerless
107. Ibid., para 147.
108. ECtHR, Bosphorus, cited supra note 13.
109. ECtHR, Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 27021/08, judgment of 7 July 2011,
para 82.
110. Jacqué, op. cit. supra note 11, 1005–1006.
111. Al-Jedda, cited supra note 109.
112. Lock, op. cit. supra note 50, 1034.
113. Gragl, op. cit. supra note 27, pp. 132–133.
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to remedy any violations of the Convention stemming from primary Union
law. Consequently, since the EU lacks anyKompetenz-Kompetenz to amend its
own constitutional basis, it has been argued that primary law should be exempt
from Strasbourg’s judicial control.114
In this context, it has also been called into question whether
intergovernmental policies such as the EU’s CFSP should be subject to the
ECtHR’s judicial supervision to the same extent as the rest of Union law.115
Given the ECJ’s lack of jurisdiction in the area of the CFSP (Art. 24(1)
TEU),116 most of the legal acts and measures enacted within the framework of
the CFSP are beyond the ECJ’s judicial reach, excluding review of these
provisions in the light of fundamental rights protection. This means that in
these specific cases the ECJ is incapable of autonomously and independently
applying the standards demanded by the Convention and Strasbourg’s case
law, and thus preventing violations of the Convention on the “domestic”
level.117
The Accession Agreement, however, does not allow for exclusion of
primary law from the jurisdiction of the ECtHR. Firstly, such exclusion would
be an enormous privilege for the Union, as there is no other High Contracting
Party to the Convention whose constitution is exempt from Strasbourg’s
control. Secondly, even though Article 2(2) AA allows the EU to make
reservations in respect of any particular provision of the Convention,
reservations of a general character – i.e. the “immunization” of primary law
from Strasbourg’s jurisdiction – are not permitted. Lastly, such exclusion may
require the ECtHR to delineate violations of the Convention found in primary
law from violations rooted in secondary law and to decide on the exact
division of powers between the EU and the Member States – which would
constitute a blatant interference with the autonomy of Union law.118 Moreover,
the Explanatory Report clarifies that the model of attributing acts, measures
and omissions of any EU institution, body, office or agency to the EU also
applies to “acts, measures or omissions in whichever context they occur,
including with regard to matters relating to the EU Common Foreign and
114. Köngeter, “Völkerrechtliche und innerstaatliche Probleme eines Beitritts der
Europäischen Union zur EMRK”, in Bast (Ed.),Die Europäische Verfassung –Verfassungen in
Europa (Nomos, 2005), p. 245.
115. Kumin, op. cit. supra note 63, 76.
116. With minor exceptions concerning the delineation of intergovernmental and
supranational competences within EU external policies (Art. 40 TEU) and the review of the
legality of decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons
(Art. 275(2) TFEU).
117. Kumin, op. cit. supra note 63, 76.
118. Gragl, op. cit. supra note 27, pp.128–132.
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Security Policy.”119 This means that no area of European Union law, certainly
not EU primary law or intergovernmental policies, is excluded from
Strasbourg’s scrutiny and that individuals may also bring applications for
alleged violations of the Convention in these fields against the Union after
accession.
– Technical Amendments to the Convention
In order to avoid amending the substantive provisions of the Convention and
the relevant Protocols, Article 1 AA adds three interpretation clauses in its
paragraphs 5 to 7 in order to maintain the readability of the Convention120 and
to avoid cluttering the text with too many technical terms. Since the Protocols
are accessory to the Convention, and their substantive provisions are to be
regarded as additional articles to the Convention proper, the general
interpretation clauses of the Accession Agreement will also apply to the
Protocols without their needing to be amended to that effect.121 Lastly, Article
1(8) AA provides that the Convention shall be amended to allow for proper
notification of all Council of Europe Member States and the EU, after
accession, by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe.
These interpretation clauses principally provide that notions laid down in
the Convention which are regularly associated with sovereign nation-States in
the Westphalian meaning of the word, such as “national security”,
“national/domestic law(s)”, “life of the nation”, “administration of the State”,
and “territorial integrity”, shall be understood as relating also, mutatis
mutandis, to the internal legal order of the EU as a non-State Party to the
Convention. The expression “internal law” (in Arts. 41 and 52 ECHR),
however, did not require a separate interpretation clause, since this expression
will be equally applicable to the EU as a High Contracting Party after
accession.122
2.3. Reservations
The choice to base accession on an international agreement and the aspiration
to treat the Union, to the greatest possible extent, on an equal footing with the
other High Contracting Parties, also entitles the EU to make reservations upon
accession123 under the general rules of international law (Arts. 19 to 23 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). Whereas no reservations to the
119. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 23.
120. Ibid., para 27.
121. Ibid.
122. Ibid., para 31.
123. Grewe, op. cit. supra note 14, 296.
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Accession Agreement itself are permitted under Article 11 AA, Article 2 AA
enables the Union to make reservations to the Convention and to Protocol No.
1124 in accordance with Article 57 ECHR when signing or expressing its
consent to be bound by theAccession Agreement. The newly amendedArticle
57(1) ECHR will consequently permit the EU to make reservations in respect
of any particular provision of the Convention to the extent that any law of the
European Union then in force is not in conformity with the provision – with
the notable exception that reservations of a general character will not be
permitted under Article 2 AA.
With regard to the abovementioned issue of potentially excluding primary
EU law from Strasbourg’s jurisdiction, it may also be argued in this context
that a reservation to exempt the entire “constitutional” layer of a High
Contracting Party’s legal order might be incompatible not only with the
explicit wording of Article 2 AA (and Art. 19(b) of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties or its customary legal counterpart125), but also with the
Explanatory Report which particularly clarifies that the expression “law of
the European Union” covers both secondary EU law and primary EU law
(“the Treaties”).126 It thus seems that the negotiators never intended to exclude
primary law from Strasbourg’s jurisdiction and that such a reservation would
run foul of the overall objective and purpose of accession, which is the
improvement of human rights protection in Europe.
3. Accession and autonomy: Procedural aspects
3.1. The co-respondent mechanism
3.1.1. Reasons for introducing the co-respondent mechanism
Article 3 AA introduces a new Article 36(4) ECHR and therewith an
innovative mechanism to the Convention system. This mechanism enables the
EU to become a co-respondent to proceedings before the ECtHR initially
instigated against one or more of its Member States and, vice versa, also
allows the EU Member States to become co-respondents to proceedings
initially instigated against the EU. The overall objective of this provision is to
hold both the EU and the respective Member State responsible for violations
124. However, no reservations are permitted to Protocol No. 6 in accordance with its Art. 4.
Should the EU accede to other existing or future Protocols, the possibility to make reservations
is governed by Art. 57 ECHR and the respective provisions of these Protocols; cf. also
Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 35.
125. Walter, “Article 19”, in Dörr and Schmalenbach (Eds.),Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties: A Commentary (Springer, 2012), para 133.
126. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 34.
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of the Convention. This mechanism was deemed necessary not only to
accommodate the historically unprecedented step of a non-State entity with an
autonomous legal system acceding to the Convention alongside its own
Member States,127 but also to ensure that complaints submitted by individual
applicants against the wrong entity would subsequently not be dismissed.128
EU law itself, more concretely Article 1 of Protocol No. 8 to the Treaties,
stipulates that the Accession Agreement must make provision for preserving
the specific characteristics of the EU and its legal order, in particular with
regard to “the mechanisms necessary to ensure that proceedings by…
individuals are correctly addressed to Member States and/or the Union as
appropriate.”
Individuals are confronted with the fact that the predominant mode of
Union administration is the implementation of Union law and acts originally
adopted by EU institutions by the Member States,129 whereas the relevant
provisions of EU primary law (i.e. the Treaties, set up and agreed upon by the
Member States) are usually implemented by the Union institutions. This
means that, upon EU accession to the Convention, unique and legally intricate
situations may arise in which one legal act is enacted by one High Contracting
Party and then implemented by another.130 After accession, applicants will
usually not be aware of the complexities of Union law and the exact
implementation rules of EU law. Thus, they may lodge an application against
a Member State allegedly responsible for a violation of the Convention, since
they had only ever been in contact with the Member State’s authorities and not
with the Union.131 This will constitute the majority of cases, since individuals
seldom engage in a direct legal relationship with the Union and its organs.
The added value of the co-respondent mechanism is that, firstly, a
co-respondent will have the status of a party to the case. This means that if the
ECtHR finds a violation of the Convention, the co-respondent will be bound
by the obligations of Article 46 ECHR alongside the original respondent to a
case. The Explanatory Report emphasizes that the co-respondent mechanism
does not represent a procedural privilege for the EU and its Member States,
but rather a way to avoid gaps in participation, accountability and
enforceability in the Convention system – which is in fact the rationale of
accession.132 Secondly, the admissibility of an application will be assessed
without regard to the participation of the co-respondent in the proceedings.
Consequently, individual applicants are only required to exhaust the local
127. Ibid., paras. 37–38.
128. Gragl, op. cit. supra note 27, p. 141.
129. Craig, EUAdministrative Law (OUP, 2012), p. 28.
130. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 38.
131. Lock, op. cit. supra note 50, 1038–1039.
132. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 39.
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remedies of either the Union or the Member State concerned,133 not both
procedural avenues – which would require the applicant to have a rather
Herculean stamina, and suffer vast legal expenses. Lastly, a Member State
need not raise the defence that it was not responsible for a violation because it
only followed its strict obligations under EU law. If this were in fact possible,
the Strasbourg Court would be compelled to interpret the exact division of
competences between the EU and the Member States and would thus infringe
the autonomy of EU law.134 Under the new co-respondent mechanism,
however, the EU may join the proceedings as a co-respondent and can
subsequently be held responsible alongside the original respondent as a unity.
This should in any event obviate any decision by the ECtHR on the
Union-internal division of powers between the EU and the Member States.
3.1.2. Scenario 1: The EU as co-respondent
Article 3(2) AA provides that when an application is directed against one or
more EU Member States, the Union may become a co-respondent to the
proceedings in respect of an alleged violation of the Convention if it appears
that such allegation calls into question the compatibility with the rights at
issue defined in the Convention, including decisions taken under the EU
Treaties (TEU and TFEU), notably where that violation could have been
avoided only by disregarding an obligation under EU law.
This means that the test for applying the co-respondent mechanism is
fulfilled if it appears that the alleged violation of the Convention calls into
question the compatibility of a provision of EU law, either primary or
secondary, with the Convention rights at issue.135 In other words, the
mechanism can be activated if there is a normative conflict between EU law
and the Convention. With regard to violations found in secondary law, the
preconditions for applying this test make perfect sense, as only the EU itself
can subsequently remove such a violation in its own legislation. It is, however,
rather obscure why the clause “primary law” appears in this test, since it is
agreed upon by the Member States and not subject to amendments by the
Union itself.136 The most convincing reason for this might be that the relevant
provisions of the Treaties are principally being implemented by the EU
institutions, which in turn entails a major responsibility for them to do so in
conformity with the Convention.
The Explanatory Report additionally states that a violation of the
Convention, which could only have been avoided by a Member State by
133. Ibid., para 40.
134. Lock, op. cit. supra note 10, 165.
135. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 48.
136. Lock, op. cit. supra note 10, 169–170.
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disregarding an obligation under Union law, is most likely to emerge when a
provision of EU law “leaves no discretion to a Member State as to its
implementation at the national level”.137 Conversely, the test for applying the
co-respondent mechanism fails in cases where it would be inappropriate to
include the Union as a co-respondent, for example, when EU law does not
force a Member State to act in a way contrary to the Convention.138
Consequently, the co-respondent mechanism would not be applicable139 in
cases such as MSS v. Belgium and Greece140 where the Member States
enjoyed a broad margin of discretion whether to return asylum applicants to
the Member State originally responsible for examining the asylum application
or whether to arrogate the case by exercising the sovereignty clause under
Article 3(2) of the Dublin II Regulation.141 Although the word “notably” in
Article 3(2) AA may suggest that the element of normative conflict could be
only one of several such elements, which have not been included in this
non-exhaustive enumeration, the example of MSS v. Belgium and Greece
demonstrates that a normative conflict between EU law and the Convention
(without any discretionary leeway for the Member States) would be the only
case where the EU may join the proceedings as co-respondent.
With regard to the assessment by the ECtHR and the question of the EU’s
legal autonomy, it is interesting to note that Strasbourg may only determine
whether it is plausible that the conditions for joining the parties as
co-respondents are fulfilled – of course in the light of the criteria laid down in
Article 3(2) AA, and without prejudice to its assessment of the merits of the
case.142 “Plausible” is not a very persuasive word and will consequently not
prompt the ECtHR to immerse itself into the delicacies of EU law and the
internal division of competences between the Union and its Member States. It
will most likely content itself with the cursory assessment whether there is an
evident and comprehensive nexus between Member State legislation and
137. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 48.
138. Submission by the AIRE Centre and Amnesty International, Informal Working Group
on the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights
(CDDH-UE), AI Index: IOR 61/003/2011, 14 March 2011, para 6. The document lists the
following real-life cases, inter alia, as examples for an inappropriate inclusion of the EU as a
co-respondent: ECtHR, MSS, cited supra note 103; ECtHR, Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia,
Appl. No. 25965/04, judgment of 7 Jan. 2010; Case C-497/10 PPU,Mercredi v. Chaffe [2010]
ECR I-14309.
139. Lock, op. cit. supra note 10, 176.
140. ECtHR,MSS, cited supra note 103.
141. Cf. also Gragl, “The Shortcomings of Dublin II: Strasbourg’sM.S.S. Judgment and its
implications for the European Union’s Legal Order”, in Benedek, Benoît-Rohmer, Karl and
Nowak (Eds.), European Yearbook on Human Rights 2012 (Neuer Wissenschaftlicher Verlag
2012), 123–139.
142. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 55.
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Union law or whether an alleged violation of the Convention is rooted in the
interaction of those two legal orders, without specifying any legal details in
this matter.143 This, again, will safeguard the autonomy of EU law, as the
Strasbourg Court is not allowed to adjudicate in any way on the division of
powers and attribution of responsibility between the Union and its Member
States.144
3.1.3. Scenario 2: The Member States as co-respondents
Article 3(3) AA governs the reverse scenario and states that when an
application is directed against the EU, the Member States may become
co-respondents to the proceedings in respect of an alleged violation of the
Convention, if it appears that such allegation calls into question the
compatibility with the rights at issue defined in the Convention of a provision
of primary law, notably where that violation could have been avoided only by
disregarding an obligation under the Treaties.
Again, the Strasbourg Court can join the two parties as respondent and
co-respondent if it appears that there is a normative conflict between Union
law and the Convention. More precisely, it may decide to do so if it appears
that the alleged violation of the Convention calls into question the
compatibility of a provision of primary Union law with the Convention rights
at issue.145 It is therefore apparent that the drafters based the second test for
triggering the co-respondent mechanism on Strasbourg’s Matthews
judgment.146 With regard to potential dangers to the autonomy of EU law, the
same conditions as under Article 3(2) AA apply: the ECtHR can base its
decision on the mere appearance of such an incompatibility between the
Convention and the Union’s primary law. Consequently, the only assessment
Strasbourg is required to conduct is to take a look at the legal basis of the
alleged violation in order to find out whether this legal basis is enshrined in
the Treaties or not. Moreover, the autonomy of EU law is preserved as the
ECtHR does not engage in a profound analysis of the legal roots of the alleged
violation, but simply contents itself with its appearance in primary law. The
ECtHR therefore does not examine what exact rank the provision in question
143. Gragl, op. cit. supra note 27, p. 160.
144. Obwexer, op. cit.supra note 2, 131–132.
145. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 49.
146. Cf. CDDH-UE(2011)16, 17, para 44 and fn 18: “During the negotiations, the view was
expressed that in recent years, the only cases which might have certainly required the
application of the co-respondent mechanism would have been Matthews v. United Kingdom,
Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland and Cooperatieve
Producentenorganisatie van de Nederlandse Kokkelvisserij U.A. v. the Netherlands.”
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has within the hierarchy of Union law, which leaves the autonomy of the
Union’s legal order perfectly intact.147
In this context, another interesting question arises where the Accession
Agreement remains entirely silent. It does not mention whether in a case
where a violation is found in primary law (i.e. international agreements
concluded by the Member States), it would be necessary that simply one,
some or maybe even all Member States join the proceedings as
co-respondents. Even though all the Member States are in fact responsible for
the provisions contained in the Treaties, the co-respondent mechanism would
probably be rendered completely unworkable if proceedings involved
twenty-nine Parties (the EU plus twenty-eight Member States). Thus the
participation of just some Member States must necessarily suffice. This
argument is additionally supported by the fact that Article 3(4) AA, which
governs applications directed against both the EU and one or more of its
Member States,148 allows for a change of status of any respondent to that of
co-respondent.As the conditions for becoming a co-respondent inArticle 3(4)
AA and Article 3(3) AA are basically identical (except for the fact that the
co-respondent was, at the outset, nominated as the original respondent) there
should be no substantive difference. As a result, it should also be admissible
under Article 3(3) AA that only some Member States join proceedings as
co-respondents.149
3.1.4. Scenario 3: Applications against both the EU and one or more
Member States
The last scenario in this context covers applications directed against both the
EU and one (or more) Member States in respect of an alleged violation. In this
case, either of these respondents might, if it considers the criteria set out in
Article 3(2) or (3) AA fulfilled, ask the Strasbourg Court to change its status
into that of co-respondent. The High Contracting Party or Parties then
changing their status to that of co-respondent could then be a Party or Parties
not responsible for the act or omission allegedly causing the violation, but only
for the legal basis of such an act or omission.150 In a similar fashion to the
procedure set out with regard to cases in which an application is only directed
against one High Contracting Party, the Strasbourg Court will then inform
both the applicant and the other respondent about the invitation or the request,
147. Gragl, op. cit. supra note 27, p. 166.
148. Cf. below for further details on the procedure laid down in Art. 3(4) AA.
149. Lock, op. cit. supra note 10, 171.
150. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 56.
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and set a short time-limit for comments (analogous to Art. 38 of the Rules of
the Court).151
At first glance, it is not obvious why Article 3(4) of the Accession
Agreement and thus a separate provision on the details of the co-respondent
mechanism are necessary when an application is directed against both the
Union and a Member State at the same time. The main reason for this separate
provision is that if a case is directed against multiple respondents (and
therefore not co-respondents), the ECtHR will examine this case as a bundle
of applications each of which is directed against one respondent. As a result,
these applications are simply joined together. This also means that each
application needs to fulfil the admissibility criteria of Articles 34 and 35
ECHR, most importantly the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies.
Compared to the co-respondent mechanism, the applicant does not need to
exhaust the domestic remedies within the co-respondent’s legal order, as the
admissibility criteria of a case will be assessed with regard to the participation
of the co-respondent.152
3.1.5. The voluntary nature of the co-respondent mechanism
Article 3(5) AA explicitly states that a High Contracting Party becomes
co-respondent entirely voluntarily – either by decision of the ECtHR upon its
own request or by accepting an invitation from the ECtHR. The Explanatory
Report additionally clarifies that no High Contracting Party to the Convention
can be compelled against its will to become a co-respondent. In other words,
the acceptance of such an invitation by the concerned High Contracting Party
would be a necessary condition for it to become co-respondent. One might
argue that the voluntary nature of the co-respondent mechanism reflects the
fact that the original application was directed against another party and not
against the potential co-respondent and that no High Contracting Party can
therefore be forced to become a party to a concrete case where it was not
named in the original application.153 It is nevertheless not entirely clear why a
potential co-respondent should not be forced to join the proceedings. It is also
beyond doubt that in cases where an application is directed against both the
Union and a Member State and both respondents are therefore parties to the
case right from the start of the proceedings, they have no choice but to
participate in these proceedings in Strasbourg. Most convincingly, such a
situation will not differ when these parties are joined as co-respondents by
decision of the Strasbourg Court in a later stage of the proceedings.154 This is
151. Ibid., para 57.
152. Lock, op. cit. supra note 10, 167.
153. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 53.
154. Lock, op. cit. supra note 50, 1044–1045.
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nonetheless a weakness of the Accession Agreement, which could easily have
been overcome by introducing an obligation on the EU and the Member States
to join proceedings as co-respondent when the compatibility of EU law with a
Convention right is called into question.155
Yet, even though the Accession Agreement does not contain an explicit
obligation for the EU and the Member States to join a case as co-respondents,
Annex II of the Accession Agreement at least requires the EU to make a
Declaration at the time of signature of the Agreement ensuring that “it will
request to become a co-respondent to the proceedings before the European
Court of Human Rights or accept an invitation by that Court to that effect,
where the conditions set out in Article 3(2) of the Accession Agreement are
met.” Despite its non-binding character, it can be expected that the EU will
comply with this request not only because of the general principle of bona
fides in public international law, but also – and especially – because of its
specific and unique relationship with the Convention regime and the ECtHR.
3.1.6. The principle of unity of Union and Member States and joint
responsibility
Apportioning responsibility separately to the respondent and the
co-respondent would entail a decision on the division of powers between the
Member States and the Union and thus certainly encroach upon the EU’s legal
autonomy;156 the EU and its Member States will therefore be considered a
legal “unity” for the purpose of the co-respondent mechanism.157 Article 3(7)
AA consequently provides that the respondent and the co-respondent will be
jointly responsibly for a violation found by the ECtHR, unless the Court
decides – on the basis of the reasons given by the respondent and the
co-respondent, and having sought the views of the applicant – that only one of
them be held responsible.
It can nonetheless be assumed that both the EU and the Member States will
have a political and monetary interest in exactly indicating the origin of the
violation and the precise share of blame in order to guarantee that such
violation does not occur again158 or that the payment of just satisfaction is
divided proportionally to each party’s responsibility.159 This means that after
accession, the Union must develop internal rules to determine the procedure
155. O’Meara, “‘A more secure Europe of rights?’The European Court of Human Rights,
the Court of Justice of the European Union and EU Accession to the ECHR”, 12 German Law
Journal (2011), 1813–1832, 1821.
156. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 62.
157. Obwexer, op. cit. supra note 2, 127.
158. CDDH-UE(2010)17, para 14.
159. Response of the European Group of National Human Rights Institutions, “EU
Accession to the ECHR, CDDH-UE”, 15–18 March 2011, 11.
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for implementing and activating the co-respondent mechanism and to enforce
Strasbourg’s judgments in accordance with the division of competences.160
Given the confidentiality of the negotiations on the EU-internal rules
regarding accession, no details on the concrete arrangement, functioning, and
execution of these Union-internal rules are available at this time.161 One can
therefore only speculate how these rules will eventually work or which
institutions will be involved. In the past, it has been proposed that either a
newly established committee be created, possibly made up of representatives
from the Member States and the EU, who would then decide on the basis of
Union law how the internal responsibility should be allocated, or that the ECJ
be given jurisdiction to assign responsibility.162 This would of course entail
the introduction of a new procedure before the ECJ, since no existing
procedure entirely fits the requirements of this special form of action.163 The
introduction of such a procedure before the Luxembourg Court would,
nevertheless, also benefit the development and further clarification of
European Union law, as it would result in an authoritative and binding
interpretation of the Union-internal distribution of competences and
responsibilities.164
With regard to the substantive determination of responsibility, it is safe to
say that it will be a highly complex task to determine whether the EU or a
Member State was in fact responsible for an alleged violation of the
Convention. Arguably, it may be consistent that the legislative organs of the
Union would be held responsible for directly applicable regulations in
violation of the Convention as, firstly, the Member States are obliged to
comply with their provisions and, secondly, in the majority of cases, they have
no discretion in doing so. In most cases, however, EU law is indirectly
implemented and enforced by the Member States,165 which leaves the
deciding body with two alternatives. It could either decide that the legal act in
violation of the Convention fell within the scope of application by the Member
States, since their organs have acted in the first place, or that the Union
160. Jacqué, op. cit. supra note 11, 1016.
161. Cf. however Case T-331/11, Besselink v. Council, judgment of 12 Sept. 2013, nyr, in
which the General Court held that the Council’s refusal to give access to Negotiating Directive
No. 5 and to those undisclosed parts of the requested document setting out the principles laid
down in the EU Treaty that should govern negotiations for EU accession to the Convention, or
which only set out the questions to be addressed in the negotiations, was unlawful.
162. Lock, “EU accession to the ECHR: Implications for judicial review in Strasbourg”, 35
EL Rev. (2010), 777, 787.
163. Cf. e.g., the different preconditions necessary for initiating actions for contractual and
non-contractual liability under Arts. 268 and 340 TFEU, respectively.
164. Lock, op. cit. supra note 162, 787.
165. Von Danwitz, Europäisches Verwaltungsrecht (Springer, 2008), pp. 315–316.
ECHR accession 39
remains responsible as the Member States ultimately act in lieu and support of
the European Union.166
The internal attribution of responsibility for legal acts in violation of the
Convention appears to be even more complex with regard to directives, as they
require legislative implementation in the legal system of the Member States. If
the directive in question is transposed verbatim or synonymously into
domestic law or if the Member State is not left any discretion in doing so, the
Union may be held responsible for the violation. This yardstick would of
course analogously apply in cases where the transposition into domestic law
remains within the boundaries of a certain “structural congruence”167 or
general legal context, which EU law requires the Member State to respect.168
In other words, if the Member State remains within the limits of the discretion
conferred on it, the responsibility lies with the Union; if the Member State
chooses to implement provisions going beyond these limits, the respective
Member State could be held responsible.169
3.2. Inter-party cases after accession
3.2.1. Necessary amendments to the Convention
As there have been no inter-State complaints between EU Member States
since the creation of the European Union170 and the High Contracting Parties
very rarely use this particular procedure under Article 33 ECHR in order to
enforce human rights, it only plays a minor and rather arcane role in the
ECtHR’s human rights protection machinery. Inter-State complaints
nevertheless remain an essential part of the Convention which the Accession
Agreement must duly take into account with respect to the EU’s specific legal
nature in order to allow for the proper functioning of the Convention regime
after accession. Article 4 AA therefore introduces the term “inter-Party
applications” (in lieu of “inter-State applications”) and therewith clarifies that
the European Union, as a non-State entity, will be a full-fledged party to the
Convention after its accession. Article 4(1) AA provides for the amendment of
Article 29(2) ECHR in order to allow a Chamber of the Court to decide on the
166. Heißl, “Happy End einer unendlichen Geschichte? Der Beitritt der EU zur EMRK und
seine Auswirkungen auf Österreich”, in Holoubek, Martin and Schwarzer (Eds.), Die Zukunft
derVerfassung – Die Verfassung der Zukunft? Festschrift für Karl Korinek zum 70. Geburtstag
(Springer, 2010), p. 146.
167. Frenz,Handbuch Europarecht Band 5:Wirkungen und Rechtsschutz (Springer, 2010),
para 923.
168. Case C-131/88, Commission v.Germany (Groundwater Directive) [1991] ECR I-825,
para 6.
169. Heißl, op. cit. supra note 166, p. 146.
170. Winkler, op. cit. supra note 79, p. 84.
CML Rev. 201440 Gragl
admissibility and merits of inter-Party applications submitted under Article
33, whilst Article 4(2) AA changes the heading of Article 33 ECHR itself to
read as “Inter-Party cases”.171 The coexistent standing of the EU and its
Member States (both as applicants and respondents before the ECtHR),
however, raises considerable questions in the light of Article 344 TFEU and
the exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ.
3.2.2. The ECJ’s exclusive jurisdiction under Article 344 TFEU
The relevant paragraphs of the Explanatory Report concerning Article 4 AA
emphasize that all High Contracting Parties to the Convention will be able to
bring inter-Party cases against the EU and vice versa under Article 33 ECHR
after accession.172 But the Explanatory Report also correctly notes that it does
not govern the issue whether Union law permits inter-Party cases to the
Strasbourg Court involving issues of EU law between the EU Member States
inter se, or between the EU and one of its Member States. It additionally
addresses the matter of the EU’s legal autonomy, since Article 344 TFEU and
Article 3 of Protocol No. 8 to the Treaties state that the EU Member States
“undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application
of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than those provided for
therein.”173 If theAccession Agreement in fact contained an express provision
on this issue, it would undoubtedly encroach on the exclusive jurisdiction of
the ECJ and thus on the autonomy of EU law. This, however, is not the case,
since the Accession Agreement leaves the solution of this issue to the
European Union.
On the other hand, the very silence of the Accession Agreement on this
matter raises the question whether Article 344 TFEU will bar the Member
States and the EU from bringing inter-Party complaints against one another
after accession. When EU accession to the Convention was first mooted in
1979, the potential risks for disrupting the Union’s judicial system in the
context of inter-Party applications between Member States and the future
relationship between Article 33 ECHR and Article 344 TFEU caused great
anxiety.174 It is the objective and purpose of Article 344 TFEU to guarantee
that EU law is interpreted in a consistent and coherent manner which can most
efficiently be accomplished by designating the Union courts as the only courts
competent to decide problems of EU law.175 Beyond that, the reference to “the
Treaties” in Article 344 TFEU not only refers to primary law, but also to
171. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 71.
172. Ibid., para 70.
173. Ibid., para 72.
174. Commission, cited supra note 4, para 27.
175. Lock, “The ECJ and the ECtHR: The future relationship between the two European
courts”, 8 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals (2009), 375–398, 389.
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secondary law176 and, most importantly in this context, to international
agreements concluded by the EU.177 In its seminal MOX Plant case, the ECJ
underlined the importance of Article 344 TFEU and ruled that this provision
precludes Member States from initiating proceedings before another court for
the settlement of disputes within the scope of Union law.178 Moreover, the
principle of sincere cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU also prohibits the Union
organs from submitting a dispute concerning the interpretation or application
of EU law to other courts or tribunals.179 Upon accession, the Convention and
the Accession Agreement will also become an integral part of the Union’s
legal order.180 This means that under Article 19(1) TEU, the ECJ will have the
corresponding jurisdiction to exclusively interpret and apply the provisions of
the Convention in disputes between the Member States inter se and between a
Member State and the EU, if the said dispute also relates to EU law.181
Moreover, if a dispute about the Convention also relates to the interpretation
and application of EU law, the Member States and the Union organs are
correspondingly left with the Union-internal dispute settlement mechanisms
provided for by the Treaties, viz. infringement proceedings under Articles 258
TFEU and 259 TFEU; the action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU; and
the action for failure to act under Article 265 TFEU. Prima facie, these
procedures constitute the sole conflict resolution mechanisms available to the
Member States and the Union organs for the settlement of disputes between
them,182 while complaints by the Member States inter se or between them and
the EU under Article 33 ECHR would be incompatible with Article 344
TFEU.183 It is therefore apparent that this requirement was particularly
designed to preserve the role of the ECJ and its exclusive jurisdiction. Yet, it
should also be noted that not every dispute between the Member States inter se
and between the Member States and the EU about the Convention will be
linked to EU law – therefore in such cases Article 344 TFEU and the exclusive
176. Wegener, “Art. 344 AEUV” in Calliess and Ruffert (Eds.), EUV/AEUV-Kommentar
(Beck, 2011), para 1.
177. Commission v. Germany, cited supra note 64, para 52.
178. Case C-459/03, Commission v. Ireland (MOX Plant) [2006] ECR I-4635, paras. 133
and 135.
179. Lock, Das Verhältnis zwischen dem EuGH und internationalen Gerichten (Mohr
Siebeck, 2010), p. 292.
180. Haegeman, cited supra note 62, para 5.
181. Cf. also Eeckhout, “Human rights and the autonomy of EU law: Pluralism or
integration?”, 66 Current Legal Problems (2013), 169–202, 194–195.
182. Schott, “Die Auswirkungen eines Beitritts der EU zur EMRK auf die Durchsetzung
des Grundrechtsschutzes in Europa”, Jusletter 22 March 2010, 1, p. 4.
183. European Convention, Modalities and consequences of incorporation into the Treaties
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and accession of the Community/Union to the ECHR,
CONV 116/02, WG II 1, 18 June 2002, 20, footnote 2.
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jurisdiction of the ECJ will correspondingly not apply and the Member States
and the EU will be free to submit cases to the ECtHR.
3.2.3. Article 5 AA: The interpretation of Article 55 ECHR
Luxembourg’s exclusive jurisdiction could possibly clash with its counterpart
in the Convention, namely Article 55 ECHR, which grants the ECtHR
exclusive jurisdiction and priority in settling inter-State complaints between
the High Contracting Parties to the Convention under Article 33 ECHR.184 At
first glance, it is obvious that Article 55 ECHR and Article 344 TFEU are
diametrically opposed provisions, for both entitle the respective courts to exert
exclusive jurisdiction over the same source of law, which is the Convention.
This means that after accession, cases between the EU Member States or
between a Member State and the Union could be adjudicated by the ECJ and
the ECtHR.185 Since both courts consider their jurisdiction as exclusive, it
must be decided which of these courts shall have the last say in such cases, lest
a conflict of jurisdictions arise186 due to the normative overlap of the
Convention provisions in the Convention itself and in its manifestation as
incorporated Union law.
In contrast to Article 344 TFEU, Article 55 ECHR is a flexible exclusive
jurisdiction clause, which explicitly acknowledges that the High Contracting
Parties to the Convention may choose to waive ECtHR jurisdiction and to
settle their disputes before another court or tribunal. Article 5 AA also
accommodates the exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ under Article 344 TFEU
and solves the looming jurisdictional conflict between Strasbourg and
Luxembourg by indicating that proceedings before the ECJ do not constitute
means of dispute settlement within the meaning of Article 55 ECHR. Thus,
Article 55 ECHR does not prevent the operation of the rule laid down in
Article 344 TFEU,187 which means that neither the EU nor its Member States
violate the Convention if they submit disputes concerning the interpretation or
application of the Convention – which will form an integral part of EU law –
to the ECJ, and not the ECtHR.188
3.2.4. The exhaustion of local remedies rule in support of the ECJ’s
exclusive jurisdiction
Due to its potential exclusive jurisdiction in adjudicating inter-Party cases
within the scope of EU law, the ECJ might seize the chance to apply Article
184. Obwexer, op. cit. supra note 2, 136.
185. Gragl, op. cit. supra note 27, 178–179.
186. Lock, op. cit. supra note 175, 391–392.
187. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 74.
188. Obwexer, op. cit. supra note 2, 137.
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344 TFEU extensively and to coerce the Member States to use the Union-
internal dispute settlement mechanism in order to solve legal conflicts
between them. In cases of non-compliance, the Commission may initiate
infringement proceedings under Article 258 TFEU whereupon the ECJ could
again resort to the standards found in its MOX Plant judgment and hold the
Member State in question responsible for undermining the exclusive
jurisdiction of the ECJ.189
This approach would nonetheless be reconcilable with the objective and
purpose of accession and the functioning of the Convention system. One could
argue that the involvement of the ECJ in inter-Party cases between the
Member States inter se and between the EU and the Member States is
necessary under Article 35(1) ECHR, because in the case of non-exhaustion
of domestic remedies, the case would be declared inadmissible by the ECtHR.
As the ECtHR is merely competent to monitor alleged violations of the
Convention subsidiarily, the domestic courts – including the ECJ after
accession – must consequently be afforded ample opportunity to remedy these
violations themselves before Strasbourg may decide on them. In other words,
the ECtHR has no complementary jurisdiction alongside the ECJ to adjudicate
upon inter-Party complaints, but rather a subsidiary jurisdiction, which can
only be triggered after all local remedies have been exhausted, according to
Article 35(1) ECHR. Disputes between EU Member States inter se or between
the Member States and the Union must, as a consequence, firstly be brought
before the ECJ for two reasons: firstly, due to the Union-internal provision of
Article 344 TFEU, and secondly, due to the international obligations under the
Convention itself, namely Article 35(1) ECHR.190
This leaves the European Union and the Member States with the procedural
avenues provided for by the EU Treaties to settle disputes regarding the
interpretation and application of the Convention between them, before they
may bring a case to the ECtHR. In such a case, the Member States may use
infringement proceedings under Article 259 TEU in disputes inter se, and the
action for annulment under Article 263(2)TFEU or the action for failure to act
under Article 265(1) TFEU against the EU. The European Union, on the other
hand, may use infringement proceedings under Article 258 TFEU in order to
settle disputes with the Member States before it may submit an inter-party
complaint to the Strasbourg Court, but only if the Member State in question
has in fact implemented Union law.191
189. Gragl, op. cit. supra note 27, p. 186.
190. Ibid., p. 188.
191. Cf. also the first sentence of Art.51(1) of the Charter and Schott, op. cit. supra note
182, p. 5.
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3.2.5. The future of inter-party cases
This means, in conclusion, that all High Contracting Parties will be able to
bring a case against the Union and vice versa. But the ECJ nonetheless has the
last say in matters regarding Union law and may determine that a Member
State has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 344 TFEU, if said
Member State has first lodged an inter-Party application before the Strasbourg
Court. In addition, according to Article 35(1) ECHR, the ECJ must be given a
chance to remedy alleged violations of the Convention before the ECtHR may
adjudicate on any applications. Therefore, the Convention itself enables the
ECJ to interpret and apply Union law in order to preserve its well-guarded
autonomy. The Member States and the Union are thence obliged to settle their
disputes via the Union-internal mechanisms (infringement proceedings,
annulment actions, action for failure to act) before they make take their
applications to the ECtHR.
3.3. The prior involvement of the ECJ
3.3.1. Reasons for introducing the prior involvement procedure
According to the principles of the Union’s legal autonomy, cases relating to
EU law may not reach the ECtHR before the ECJ has had the opportunity to
adjudicate upon those cases. Therefore, the EU negotiators strove to ensure
that external review by the ECtHR be preceded by an effective internal review
by the courts of the Member States and the EU courts,192 in order to satisfy the
requirements of Article 35(1) ECHR and to avoid any external interference
with the EU’s autonomous legal order. The principal concern in this regard
was that the exhaustion of local remedies under Article 35(1) ECHR would be
inadequate or insufficient to guarantee the ECJ’s prior involvement in such a
situation.193 This could result in a scenario in which the ECJ might be
side-lined in proceedings and where the ECtHR would subsequently interpret
a provision of EU law without the prior involvement of the ECJ,194 thereby
undermining the jurisdictional monopoly of Luxembourg and thus the
autonomy of EU law.195 As long as questions of EU law have not yet been
192. Discussion Document of the Court of Justice of the European Union on certain aspects
of the accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 5 May 2010, paras. 5–7.
193. Kumin, op. cit. supra note 63, 82.
194. Cf. Baratta, “Accession of the EU to the ECHR: The rationale for the ECJ’s prior
involvement mechanism” 50 CML Rev. (2013), 1305–1332, for a more extensive analysis of
the prior involvement mechanism.
195. Jacqué, op. cit. supra note 11, 1016.
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clarified and decided by the ECJ, it is possible that the case in Strasbourg is
based on an erroneous understanding of the applicable law.196
3.3.2. The solution of the Accession Agreement
Article 3(6) AA ensures that in proceedings to which the EU is a
co-respondent, the Court of Justice of the European Union shall be afforded
sufficient time to assess the compatibility with the Convention rights at issue
of the provision of Union law as under Article 3(2), if it has not yet made such
an assessment. The possibility of involving the ECJ in such proceedings thus
creates an institutional link between the courts in Luxembourg and
Strasbourg.197
As annulment proceedings under Article 263(4)TFEU must in any event be
exhausted as domestic remedies under Article 35(1) ECHR,198 the ECJ will
always have had the chance to rule on a case before the ECtHR, if an individual
directs an application against the EU itself. Thus Article 3(6) is only
applicable in cases which arise from individual applications concerning acts
or omissions of the Member States, and in which the applicant first has to
exhaust domestic remedies available before the national courts of the
respondent Member State in order to ensure that the admissibility criterion of
Article 35(1) ECHR is fulfilled. The courts of the Member States may or, in
the case of Article 267(3) TFEU, must then refer a question to the ECJ for a
preliminary ruling on the interpretation of a primary law provision or the
interpretation and validity of a secondary law provision.199 However, as the
parties to the proceedings before the Member State courts can only suggest
such a reference, but not enforce it,200 the preliminary reference procedure
cannot be considered as a legal remedy that an individual applicant is required
to exhaust before submitting a case to the ECtHR.201
As it is uncertain that a reference for a preliminary ruling will be made in
every case in which the compatibility of an EU act with the Convention is
contested202 (e.g., if a Member State court erroneously assumes that there is
no duty to do so203), the ECtHR could need to adjudicate on an application
involving EU law, but without the ECJ having the prior chance of reviewing
196. Kokott and Sobotta, “The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU after Lisbon”,
[2010] EUI Working Papers, Academy of European Law 2010/6, p. 4.
197. Lock, op. cit. supra note 10, p. 181.
198. ECommHR, Dufay v. The European Communities, cited supra note 52.
199. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 65.
200. Kokott and Sobotta, op. cit. supra note 196, p. 5.
201. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 65.
202. Discussion Document of the CJEU, cited supra note 192, para 10, and Joint
Communication from Presidents Costa and Skouris, 17 Jan. 2011, p. 2.
203. Lock, op. cit. supra note 162, 791.
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the compatibility of the provision in question by ruling on the validity of a
secondary law provision or the interpretation of a primary law provision.204 It
is the objective of the prior involvement procedure in Article 3(6) AA to
remedy this potential side-lining of the ECJ. This means, in a nutshell, that
contrary to the issue whether the ECtHR may be a superior court or whether it
would have the last say in the matter of human rights protection after
accession, the legal problem at this point is which court will have the first say
in such proceedings.205
3.3.3. The need for a Union-internal procedure
Article 3(6) AA remains silent on the prior involvement procedure before the
ECJ in order not to interfere with the autonomy of EU law. If the Agreement
had provided for a detailed procedure, this would be tantamount to a hidden
Treaty amendment and could thus violate the requirements for upholding the
autonomy of EU law.206 Consequently, the final determination of the
procedure before the ECJ has been left to the EU; it remains, however,
confidential at the time of writing. We may therefore only speculate on the
concrete details of this procedure.
The European Commission argued that the general features and the specific
procedural rules of the prior involvement of the ECJ should be similar to those
governing the preliminary ruling procedure under Article 267 TFEU.207 The
procedure could ideally be initiated by the Commission, requesting the ECJ to
decide upon the compatibility of an EU act with the Convention after an
application has been declared admissible in Strasbourg.208 If the Commission
makes such a reference, the proceedings before the ECtHR would be
suspended, since the assessment by the ECJ is intended to conform to the
principle of subsidiarity and should thence take place before the ECtHR
decides on the merits of the application.209 Most importantly, an extension of
the Commission’s power to initiate proceedings before the ECJ after
204. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, paras. 65–66.
205. Berger, “Der Beitritt der Europäischen Union zur EMRK” in Österreichische
Juristenkommission (Ed.), Grundrechte im Europa der Zukunft (Linde, 2010), p. 54.
206. Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Sabena [1976] ECR 455, para 58.
207. European Commission, Working Document on the Previous Involvement of the Court
of Justice in the Context of the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, DS 1930/10, 10 Jan. 2011,
paras. 5–6 and 11.
208. Timmermans, “L’adhésion de l’Union Européenne à la Convention européenne des
Droits de l’homme”, Audition organisée par la Commission des affaires constitutionnelles du
18 mars 2010, European Parliament, Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Hearing on the
Institutional Aspects of the European Union’s Accession to the European Convention on
Human Rights, 18 March 2010, pp. 7–8.
209. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 66.
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accession would not violate the autonomy of EU law, as the Commission
already has similar procedural avenues at its disposal,210 e.g. annulment
proceedings under Article 263(2) TFEU in order to have legislation reviewed
by Luxembourg as to its compatibility with the Charter and the Convention;211
or infringement proceedings under Article 258 TFEU against the respective
Member State, if the national court of last resort has failed to make a reference
to the ECJ.212 If, on the other hand, the Commission prefers not to initiate any
proceedings, it may be assumed that the Union does not have any interest in
involving the ECJ in the proceedings before the ECtHR. The ECtHR would
subsequently be in a position to find such a violation without prior
involvement of the ECJ.213
3.3.4. Legal consequences of the EU-internal procedure
Despite the predominant preoccupation of the Accession Agreement with
protecting the EU’s legal autonomy vis-à-vis the Convention system, the last
sentence of Article 3(6)AA also addresses the issue that the prior involvement
of the ECJ will not affect the powers and jurisdiction of the ECtHR, and that
the assessment of the case in question by the ECJ will not bind the Strasbourg
Court.214 It is therefore very interesting to note that this is the only provision
in the Accession Agreement which provides that EU accession to the
Convention shall affect neither the competences nor the functioning of the
Strasbourg Court.
Article 3(6) AA thence only prompts the ECtHR to afford the ECJ
sufficient time to assess the case. The wording sufficient time, however, is
open to various interpretations and raises the question what these words mean
exactly and what period of time they should cover. There is no existing
comparable form of procedure before the ECtHR, where it would suspend its
own proceedings in order to allow another court to examine the case in
question. Until there is significant ECtHR case law on this matter after
accession, we may preliminarily conclude that the term sufficient time is
related to the ECJ’s obligation to deliver its rulings quickly in order to avoid
undue delays, for which the Explanatory Report mentions a time-frame of six
to eight months.215 Should the ECJ exceed this period of time, the ECtHR
might convict the EU for a breach of Article 6(1) ECHR and the right to a fair
trial within a reasonable time which intends to protect “all parties to court
210. Gragl, op. cit. supra note 27, p. 242.
211. Lock, op. cit. supra note 162, 793.
212. Kokott, Henze and Sobotta, “Die Pflicht zur Vorlage an den Europäischen Gerichtshof
und die Folgen ihrer Verletzung”, 61 JZ (2006), 633–641, 640–641.
213. Lock, op. cit. supra note 50, 1050.
214. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 68.
215. Ibid., para 69.
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proceedings … against excessive procedural delays”216 and “underlines the
importance of rendering justice without delays which might jeopardize [the
Convention’s] effectiveness and credibility.”217
Lastly, the Accession Agreement does not explain what legal consequences
a decision by the ECJ in prior involvement proceedings will have for the
subsequent proceedings in Strasbourg. Particularly in the light of Opinions
1/91 and 1/00, the decision of the ECJ should be binding on the ECtHR,218
since purely advisory answers given by the ECJ would alter its functional
nature.219 The Explanatory Report nevertheless expressly states that the
assessment of the ECJ will not bind the ECtHR,220 as a binding character of
such a decision would amount to an undue privilege of the Union, which no
other High Contracting Party enjoys. This means that the Union-internal rules
to be adopted within the course of accession must take this change in the
jurisdiction of the ECJ into consideration in order to prevent any interference
with the autonomy of EU Law. Such a Union-internal rule could, for example,
bestow upon such a decision the same legal effects regular preliminary rulings
under Article 267 TFEU have (inter partes when interpreting EU law, and
erga omnes when adjudicating upon the validity of EU law).221 Moreover, if
the ECJ found that a certain provision of EU law was compatible with the
Convention and no violation of human rights had therefore occurred, this
would in no way affect the proceedings in Strasbourg, since the EU-internal
proceedings must not substitute the external supervision of the ECtHR.222
The proceedings would subsequently continue normally in Strasbourg.223
It remains, however, unclear what would happen if the ECJ concluded that
the EU act in question was incompatible with the Convention and
subsequently annulled it ex tunc. The Accession Agreement does not address
the issue whether applicants would lose their victim status before the ECtHR
after such a decision by the ECJ redressed the situation within the EU legal
order and remedied the contested breach of the Convention.224 As Article 34
ECHR requires that the applicant claim to be a victim of a violation of a
Convention right, the most substantial consequence of this loss of status
would be the case being rendered inadmissible by the ECtHR. One could
216. ECtHR, Stögmüller v. Austria, Appl. No. 1602/62, judgment of 10 Nov. 1969.
217. ECtHR, H v. France, App. No. 10073/82, judgement of 24 Oct. 1989, para 58.
218. Jacqué, op. cit. supra note 11, 1022.
219. Opinion 1/91, EEA I, cited supra note 45, para 61, and Opinion 1/00, Proposed
Agreement between the European Community and non-Member States on the establishment of
a European Common Aviation Area [2002] ECR I-3493, paras. 25, 33 and 44.
220. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 68.
221. Obwexer, op. cit. supra note 2, 135.
222. Lock, op. cit. supra note 10, 185–186.
223. Jacqué, op. cit. supra note 11, 1022.
224. Obwexer, op. cit. supra note 2, 135.
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certainly say that the decision of the Member State court in this case, which
ultimately upheld the violation of the Convention, would remain unaffected as
res judicata, and that the applicant would then still be considered a victim for
the purposes of the Convention. Only if the national decision were to be
revoked, for instance by adequately redressing the violation225 or by quashing
the previous court ruling,226 would the applicant then lose his or her victim
status.227
In this context, one should nonetheless bear in mind the principle of res
judicata as interpreted by the ECJ. In Kapferer, the ECJ clarified that a
Member State court is not always obliged to disapply its internal rules of
procedure in order to set aside a final judicial decision in violation of EU
law.228 However, the national courts cannot circumvent the supremacy of
Union law by laying down the principle of res judicata of a national provision
vis-à-vis EU law.229 The effectiveness of Union law, in particular, would be
considerably obstructed if the principle of res judicata deprived Member State
courts not only of the option of reopening a final judicial decision made in
violation of EU law, but also of redressing that violation in subsequent cases
involving the same legal issue.230 Besides the fact that EU law obliges every
national court to disapply any provision of national law potentially conflicting
with Union law,231 Luxembourg’s rulings in this context show that the
principle of res judicata will in most of the cases be required to cede to the
need to take a binding rule of Union law into account.232 The decision of the
ECJ annulling the EU act in question would, in other words, take precedence
over the decision of the Member State court, which would then be obliged to
disapply the legal acts and rulings in question.233 This would accordingly also
entail that applicants may principally lose their status as victims, since the
ECJ’s decision would remedy the violation of the Convention. This loss of
the applicant’s victim status could only be precluded if the redress offered by
225. Cf. e.g. ECtHR, Dalban v. Romania, Appl. no. 28114/95, judgment of 28 Sept. 1999,
paras. 41–45; ECtHR, Burdov v. Russia, Appl. no. 59498/00, judgment of 4 Sept. 2002, paras.
27–32.
226. Cf. e.g., ECommHR, Sert v. Turkey, Appl. no. 17598/90, decision of 1 April 1992.
227. Lock, op. cit. supra note 10, 186.
228. Case C-234/04, Kapferer v. Schlanck and Schick [2006] ECR I-2585, para 24.
229. Case C-119/05, Ministero dell’Industria, del Commercio e dell’Artigianato v.
Lucchini [2007] ECR I-6199,para 63.
230. Case C-2/08, Amministrazione dell’Economia e delle Finanze and Agenzia delle
entrate v. Fallimento Olimpiclub Srl [2009] ECR I-7501, paras. 29–32.
231. Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA [1978]
ECR 629, para 21.
232. Craig and De Búrca, EU Law:Text, cases, and materials, 5th ed. (OUP, 2011), p. 234.
233. Obwexer, op. cit. supra note 2, 135.
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the ECJ were merely partial;234 if “the circumstances complained of directly
by the applicant still obtain[ed]”;235 or if the compensation awarded by the
Member State court or the ECJ was significantly lower than the compensation
usually awarded by the ECtHR236 and the remedies for affording such
compensation were not “speedy, reasoned and executed very quickly.”237
4. The EU and the Council of Europe: Institutional interlacing
4.1. Election of judges
4.1.1. The EU judge in Strasbourg
Although it has been discussed in the past whether the EU – as a non-State
entity, practically represented by twenty-eight Member State judges at the
ECtHR – should even be entitled to have its own permanent238 or ad hoc
judge239 in Strasbourg, the negotiators of the Accession Agreement adhered
to the principle of equality of the High Contracting Parties and concluded that
it would not be justified to refuse the EU its own judge because of the
twenty-eight Member State judges already present in Strasbourg.240 Beyond
that, it was not necessary to include a specific provision on this matter in the
Accession Agreement, as Article 20 ECHR already provides that the ECtHR
consists of a number of judges equal to that of the High Contracting Parties,
and Article 22 ECHR states that these judges shall be elected by the
Parliamentary Assembly with respect to each High Contracting Party.241 This
means that the EU is entitled to have its own judge at the ECtHR upon its
accession to the Convention, who will fully participate in the ECtHR and work
234. ECtHR, Chevrol v. France, Appl. no. 49636/99, judgment of 13 May 2003, paras.
42–43.
235. ECtHR, Ohlen v. Denmark, Appl. no. 63214/00, judgment of 24 May 2005, para 26.
236. ECtHR, Scordino v. Italy (No. 1), Appl. no. 36813/97, judgment of 29 March 2006,
paras. 214–215.
237. ECtHR, Cocchiarella v. Italy, Appl. no. 64886/01, judgment of 29 March 2006,
para 97.
238. Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH), Study of technical and legal issues of
a possible EC/EU accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, DG-II(2002)006 of
28 June 2002, paras. 68–69.
239. Krüger and Polakiewicz, “Vorschläge für ein kohärentes System des
Menschenrechtsschutzes in Europa”, 28 EuGRZ (2001), 92–105, 102.
240. Steering Committee for Human Rights, DG-II(2002)006, cited supra note 238, paras.
67–69.
241. Obwexer, op. cit. supra note 2, 138.
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on equal footing with his or her colleagues hailing from the other High
Contracting Parties.242
It would therefore be best to nominate a former ECJ judge who would be
exceptionally familiar with the judicial relationship between Strasbourg and
Luxembourg.243 Should the Union decide to nominate a current ECJ judge, he
or she must in any event completely resign from their current position, as a
judge concurrently working at the ECtHR and the ECJ would blatantly
interfere with the autonomy of EU law from the international legal order.244
Thus the future EU judge will be elected by the Parliamentary Assembly in
accordance with Article 22 ECHR from a list of three candidates nominated
by the EU, have equal status to the other judges, and participate in cases just as
his or her colleagues, and not only in those cases in which the EU is a
respondent or co-respondent.245 The concrete procedure of how to establish
the list of suitable candidates for the position of the EU judge in Strasbourg
will be conducted on terms to be defined within the EU, and the choice of
candidates should take into consideration the directives246 of the
Parliamentary Assembly.247 The European Parliament has therefore suggested
that it should be involved in drawing up the list of candidates in line with a
procedure similar to that provided for in Article 255 TFEU for candidates for
the position of an ECJ judge.248
4.1.2. Participation in the Parliamentary Assembly
Article 6(1) AA provides that a delegation of the European Parliament shall be
entitled to participate and to vote in the sittings of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe whenever the Assembly exercises its
functions related to the election of judges in accordance with Article 22
ECHR. It was furthermore regarded as appropriate in this context that the
European Parliament – as the only directly-elected body of the European
Union representing the citizens of twenty-eight Member States – should be
242. Jacqué, op. cit. supra note 11, 1009, and Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9,
para 76.
243. See Vondung, Die Architektur des europäischen Grundrechtsschutzes nach dem
Beitritt der EU zur EMRK (Mohr Siebeck, 2012), p. 266 and Knauff, “Das Verhältnis zwischen
Bundesverfassungsgericht, Europäischem Gerichtshof und Europäischem Gerichtshof für
Menschenrechte”, 125 DVBL (2010) 533–542, 538–539.
244. Opinion 1/91, EEA I, cited supra note 45, paras. 47–53.
245. Jacqué, op. cit. supra note 11, 1009, and Eckes, op. cit. supra note 22, 269.
246. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, “Nomination of Candidates and Election
of Judges to the European Court of Human Rights”, Res. 1646 (2009), 27 Jan. 2009.
247. Jacqué, op. cit. supra note 11, 1009.
248. European Parliament, “Resolution on the Institutional Aspects of Accession by the
European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms” P7_TA-PROV(2010)0184, 19 May 2010, para 7.
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entitled to the same number of representatives in the Parliamentary Assembly
as the State(s) entitled to the highest number of representatives under Article
26 of the Statute of the Council of Europe.249 In practice, this means that the
delegation of the European Parliament participating in sittings of the
Parliamentary Assembly will be constituted by eighteen representatives.250
Article 6(2) AA states that the modalities of the participation of
representatives of the European Parliament in the sittings of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe and its relevant bodies (e.g. Committees)
will be defined by the Parliamentary Assembly in co-operation with the
European Parliament. These modalities will be reflected in the internal rules
of the Parliamentary Assembly,251 which means that the Assembly’s Rules of
Procedure252 require certain amendments to revise the existing provisions in
order to accommodate the specific legal nature of the European Union.253 To
that effect, the Parliamentary Assembly and the European Union conducted
discussions on these issues during the drafting of the Accession Agreement
and established a Joint Informal Body to co-ordinate the communication of
information on the EU’s accession to the Convention254 and to arrange the
mode in which representatives of the European Parliament will participate
and vote within the Parliamentary Assembly’s different bodies in the election
process.255 Similarly, the European Union is expected to draft its internal rules
in order to define the modalities for the selection of the list of candidates in
respect of the Union to be submitted to the Parliamentary Assembly.256
4.2. EU Participation in the Committee of Ministers
4.2.1. Functions of the Committee relating to the Convention
Until the European Union’s accession to the Convention, members of the
Council of Europe and the High Contracting Parties to the Convention have
249. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 75.
250. Cf. also Art. 26 of the Statute of the CoE, listing 18 representatives as the highest
number of representatives awarded to France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the UK.
251. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 76.
252. CoE Parliamentary Assembly, Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, Res. 1202 (1999),
4 Nov. 1999.
253. E.g. provisions such as Rule 17 providing that the representatives appointed by the
national parliaments of each High Contracting Party shall form national delegations will
certainly require revision, since the representatives of the European Parliament cannot be
considered representatives appointed by a national parliament.
254. CoE Parliamentary Assembly, Follow-Up to the Reform of the Council of Europe,
Resolution 1783 (2011), 25 Jan.2011, para 17.4.
255. CoE Parliamentary Assembly – European Parliament Joint Informal Body, Synopsis
of the Meeting Held in Paris on 15 June 2011, AS/Bur/AH EP PACE (2011)04, 17 June 2011.
256. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 76.
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been identical. As a result, there was no need to distinguish between the
functions of the Committee of Ministers under the Convention and its
functions as an organ of the Council of Europe.257 However, as the EU does
not become a member of the Council of Europe, it will not be automatically
represented with a voting representative in the Committee of Ministers
(Art. 14 of the Statute of the CoE). Since this would prevent the EU from
exercising several tasks in the Committee of Ministers under the ECHR,
certain rules for the EU’s involvement in this body were drawn up to allow the
Union proper participation in the Committee without becoming a member of
the Council of Europe.258
Among the most important tasks of the Committee of Ministers under the
Convention are the supervision of the execution of ECtHR judgments (Art. 46
ECHR) and of the terms of friendly settlements (Art. 39 ECHR) as well as
requesting advisory opinions from the ECtHR on certain legal questions
concerning the interpretation of the Convention and the Protocols (Art. 47
ECHR) and reducing the number of judges of the Chambers (Art. 26(2)
ECHR).259 Beyond that, the Committee of Ministers is also responsible for
several tasks which are not explicitly foreseen in the Convention, but
nonetheless contribute to its overall functioning, such as the adoption of
additional Protocols to the Convention and of other legal instruments
addressed to the ECtHR or to the High Contracting Parties (Art. 54(1), revised
by Art. 7(1) AA).260 Article 7(3) AA guarantees that the EU will be consulted
within the Committee before the adoption of a legal instrument related to the
Convention or to the selection of candidates for election of judges by the
Parliamentary Assembly.
4.2.2. Supervision of obligations in cases where the EU is respondent or
co-respondent
Article 7(2) AA provides that when the Committee of Ministers takes
decisions under these aforementioned provisions, the EU will be entitled to
participate in these meetings with the right to vote. This means that the EU and
its Member States will command twenty-nine of forty-eight votes. In this
regard, however, the principle of equality between the EU and the other High
Contracting Parties will not apply when the Committee of Ministers
supervises the execution of judgments and the terms of friendly settlements
against either the EU alone or against the EU and one or more of its Member
States as respondents and co-respondents (Art. 7(4)(a) AA). Since the
257. Jacqué, op. cit. supra note 11, 1009.
258. Lock, op. cit. supra note 10, 186.
259. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 78.
260. Ibid., para 80.
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principle of sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) TEU obliges the EU and
the Member States to act in a coordinated manner when expressing positions
and voting,261 this may force the Member States to vote in concert with the EU
and to block the supervision of the execution of judgments against the EU,
since it would be unlikely that the Union would agree with a decision that it
has failed to implement an ECtHR judgment.262 In this event, the Explanatory
Report sets out newly and specifically designed voting rules in order to
prevent “EU block-voting” and thus undermining the execution of judgments
against the Union. Certain “hyper-minorities” will ensure that the non-EU
Member States in the Committee of Ministers will be able to supervise the
proper execution of ECtHR judgments and the terms of friendly settlements
even vis-à-vis a majority of the EU itself and its Member States.263
4.2.3. Supervision of obligations in cases against High Contracting
Parties other than the EU
In the first scenario of this special example of supervision, the Union will be
precluded under the EU Treaties from expressing a position or exercising its
right to vote, when obligations under the Convention by one or more of the EU
Member States are being supervised, and the Union has not participated in the
proceedings as either respondent or co-respondent.264 This is due to the fact
that any participation in the supervision of judgments against Member States
outside the ambit of EU law would constitute a new competence for the Union
and thus violate the requirements of Article 6(2) TEU and Article 2 of
Protocol No. 8265 – otherwise the EU would have participated in the
proceedings as either respondent or co-respondent in the first place. In this
event, the EU Member States will be under no obligation under the Treaties to
act in a coordinated manner and they can accordingly express their own
position and vote (Art. 7(4)(b) AA).266
The second scenario of supervision in this context is slightly different from
the first one. When the Committee of Ministers supervises the fulfilment of
obligations under the Convention by a non-EU Member State, the EU Member
States have, again according to Article 7(4)(b) AA, no obligation under the
Union Treaties to express a position or vote in a coordinated manner. The
Member States can thus express their own position and vote, which may also
differ from that expressed by the EU itself.267 This also means that in this
261. Ibid., para 82.
262. Lock, op. cit. supra note 10, p. 187.
263. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, paras. 84–90.
264. Ibid., para 91.
265. Obwexer, op. cit. supra note 2, 140.
266. Explanatory Report, cited supra note 9, para 91.
267. Ibid., para 92.
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scenario, the EU is not precluded from exercising its right to vote. The
competence for doing so stems from Article 21 TEU and the objective to
contribute to the protection of human rights on the international scene.268
From an international legal viewpoint of the other nineteen High Contracting
Parties to the Convention (which are not EU Member States), this special
arrangement amounts to an unequal treatment, since the EU participates in the
supervision of ECtHR judgments and of terms of friendly settlements against
non-EU Member States, but not against its own Member States.269 Given the
legal and political difficulties in amending primary law, this inequality cannot
be easily removed by simply allowing the Union to participate in the
supervision of judgments against its own Member States (e.g. by introducing
a respective provision into the Treaties). In fact, this inequality may only be
overcome by also precluding the Union from participating in the supervision
of judgments against non-EU Member States or by procedurally constraining
this participation.270
5. Conclusion
This contribution demonstrates that both the entire process of EU accession to
the Convention and the Accession Agreement do, in fact, constitute a giant
leap for European human rights. Accession will be a historic achievement271
and thus pivotal in overcoming existing inconsistencies in the case law of the
ECJ and the ECtHR and in closing considerable gaps in the European system
of fundamental rights protection. International law has never before seen the
accession of an international or supranational organization as legally
integrated as the EU to a human rights treaty regime with a judicial monitoring
mechanism as sophisticated as that of the Strasbourg Court.After negotiations
between the Council of Europe and the EU were successfully concluded in
April 2013, the EU accession to the Convention is now legally tangible and
imminent. Absent any political obstacles, the Union will eventually become
both the forty-eighth High Contracting Party and the first non-State signatory
to the Convention.272 After more than thirty years of discussion, the adverse
effects of two parallel and juxtaposed legal regimes will be overcome by the
integration of the EU into Strasbourg’s human rights protection system, which
268. Obwexer, op. cit. supra note 2, 140.
269. Uerpmann-Wittzack,“Rechtsfragen und Rechtsfolgen des Beitritts der EU zur
EMRK” in Obwexer (Ed.), Die Europäische Union im Völkerrecht, Europarecht Beiheft 2
(Nomos, 2012), II.4.
270. Obwexer, op. cit. supra note 2, 140.
271. Ladenburger, op. cit. supra note 3, 44.
272. O’Meara, op. cit. supra note 155, 1813.
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means that divergences in human rights standards are expected to cease to
occur, and a greater degree of coherence in the field of human rights
protection will be assured. Subjecting EU law and the actions and omissions
of the EU institutions to the external control of the ECtHR closes an enormous
lacuna in the protection of human rights in Europe, as the Member States can
no longer hide behind the institutional veil of the EU and the EU itself can no
longer escape any obligations due to the ECtHR’s lack of jurisdiction ratione
personae in a post-accession world.
Besides triumphing in the obvious advantages of accession, we must,
however, at the same time acknowledge that there are major legal problems in
the context of accession, most notably the possible dangers to the autonomy of
EU law.273 The Accession Agreement represents – despite its overall clarity
and concise briefness – a tour de force, which had to walk a fine line,
balancing the EU’s legal autonomy with the overall functioning of the
Convention regime. The introduction of the co-respondent mechanism is to be
welcomed as an effective method of both maintaining the EU’s legal
autonomy and enabling individual applicants to overcome certain procedural
gaps in the European multi-level maze of human rights protection.
Notwithstanding this groundbreaking and innovative mechanism, there is a
serious risk that the co-respondent mechanism may become so complicated
that well-meant solutions might create even more issues in this regard.274 This
fact demands the adoption of detailed internal rules specifically designed to
address and solve these issues. At the end of the day, the decision of the
Council of the EU to conclude the Accession Agreement under Article 218(6)
TFEU is primarily dependent on the prior adoption of these new internal
rules,275 which may add further chapters to the “accession saga”.276
With respect to the prior involvement of the ECJ under Article 3(6) AA, it is
of utmost importance for the future functioning of the judicial interplay
between Luxembourg and Strasbourg that the Statute of the Court of Justice
and its Rules of Procedure are accordingly and appropriately amended to
ensure that the ECJ’s Union-internal review is conducted efficiently and
without undue delays for individual applicants.277 The ECJ’s special position
within the Convention system after accession stems from the Union’s
particular legal order and its success as an integration organization. At the
same time, however, one could argue that the prior involvement of the ECJ
amounts to an undue privilege amongst the High Contracting Parties and that
273. Besselink, op. cit. supra note 15, p. 40.
274. Lock, op. cit. supra note 50, 1054.
275. Jacqué, op. cit. supra note 11, 1022–1023.
276. Lock, op. cit. supra note 10, 196.
277. O’Meara, op. cit. supra note 155, 1826.
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this step raises doubts about the EU’s degree of integration to join the
Convention on an equal footing with the other High Contracting Parties.278
At the end of the day, it is nevertheless clear that despite all these practical
issues, EU accession to the Convention is the missing apex within the
European edifice of human rights protection. Thirty years of political and
academic discussions and three years of diplomatic efforts have finally
resulted in an instrument which is capable of resolving the legal problems
regarding the EU’s specific and autonomous legal system. Certainly, the
negotiators could only consider those issues that had already arisen at the time
of drafting. Thus, the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts are called upon to
balance any shortcomings of the Accession Agreement by properly
interpreting and applying the relevant provisions of European human rights
law. Eventually, these courts must bear in mind that the purpose and objective
of accession is not to distinguish themselves in judicial battles with their
respective counterpart, but to cooperate in order to improve the protection of
human rights for individuals in Europe.
278. Eckes, op. cit. supra note 22, 284.
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